Strategic product R&D investment policy under international rivalry in the presence of demand spillover effects
AbstractThis paper first presents the optimal conditions for strategic R&D investment policy in the cases of noncooperative and cooperative R&D investment policies with international rivalry. Then we deal with a model of strategic product (i.e., quality-improving) R&D investment competition. In particular, we analyze an optimal R&D investment policy with regard to the two cases in the presence of demand spillover effects associated with improving the quality of a product. We show how optimality depends on the strength of demand spillover effects. We also consider the same problems assuming heterogeneous consumers and alternative utility functions.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 95.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2012
Date of revision: Sep 2012
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1-155 Uegahara Ichiban-cho, Nishinomiya, Hyogo 662-8501
Web page: http://www-econ.kwansei.ac.jp/~econ/index_e.html
More information through EDIRC
strategic R&D investment policy; quality choice; international rivalry; demand spillover effects;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2012-09-30 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2012-09-30 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-INO-2012-09-30 (Innovation)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Toshihiro Okada).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.