On the Sustainability of a Monetary Union under External Shocks: a Theoretical Result and Its Application to the Gulf Countries
AbstractExternal shocks, be they political or economic, can pose a significant threat to the sustainability of a monetary union. This paper focuses on the openness of a monetary union, and examines how the degrees and characteristics of the sensitivities of its member nations towards external shocks affect the sustainability of the commitment which each of its members made when joining the union. Furthermore, we discuss the sustainability of the prospective monetary union among the Gulf Cooperation Council countries in the light of obtained insights.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 66.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2010
Date of revision: Dec 2010
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Monetary Union; Optimum Currency Areas; External Shocks; Gulf Cooperation Council;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-12-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-ARA-2010-12-18 (MENA - Middle East & North Africa)
- NEP-CBA-2010-12-18 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2010-12-18 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2010-12-18 (Monetary Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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