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Private supplemental health insurance: retirees' demand

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Author Info

  • Carine Franc

    ()
    (CERMES centre de recherche medecine, sciences, sante et societe)

  • Marc Perronnin

    ()
    (IRDES institut for research and information in health economics)

  • Aurelie Pierre

    ()
    (IRDES institut for research and information in health economics)

Abstract

In France, private health insurance, that supplements public health insurance, is essential for access to health care. About 90% of the population is covered by a private contract and around half of them obtain their coverage through their employer. Considering the financial benefits associated with group contracts compared to individual contracts, we assume that the switching behaviors vary among different beneficiaries during the transition to retirement. Indeed, despite a 1989 law, the gap in premiums increases at retirement between group and individual contracts affords the opportunity to study the marginal price effect on switching behaviors. In this study, we consider the nature of the contract prior to retirement (compulsory or voluntary membership group contract and individual contract) as an indirect measure of the price effect. We focus on its role and check for a large number of individual characteristics that may influence the new retirees' health insurance demand.

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File URL: http://www.irdes.fr/EspaceAnglais/Publications/WorkingPapers/DT9PrivateSuppleHealthInsurance.pdf
File Function: First version, 2008
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by IRDES institut for research and information in health economics in its series Working Papers with number DT9.

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Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision: Apr 2008
Handle: RePEc:irh:wpaper:dt9

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Keywords: private health insurance; retirement; switching behavior;

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  1. Marquis, M Susan & Phelps, Charles E, 1987. "Price Elasticity and Adverse Selection in the Demand for Supplementary Health Insurance," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(2), pages 299-313, April.
  2. Samuelson, William & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1988. " Status Quo Bias in Decision Making," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 7-59, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Zeynep Or & Chantal Cases & Melanie Lisac & Karsten Vrangbaek & Ulrika Winblad & Gwyn Bevan, 2009. "Are Health Problems Systemic? Politics of Access and Choice under Beveridge and Bismarck Systems," Working Papers DT27, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Sep 2009.

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