Private supplemental health insurance: retirees' demand
AbstractIn France, private health insurance, that supplements public health insurance, is essential for access to health care. About 90% of the population is covered by a private contract and around half of them obtain their coverage through their employer. Considering the financial benefits associated with group contracts compared to individual contracts, we assume that the switching behaviors vary among different beneficiaries during the transition to retirement. Indeed, despite a 1989 law, the gap in premiums increases at retirement between group and individual contracts affords the opportunity to study the marginal price effect on switching behaviors. In this study, we consider the nature of the contract prior to retirement (compulsory or voluntary membership group contract and individual contract) as an indirect measure of the price effect. We focus on its role and check for a large number of individual characteristics that may influence the new retirees' health insurance demand.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by IRDES institut for research and information in health economics in its series Working Papers with number DT9.
Length: 16 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2008
Date of revision: Apr 2008
private health insurance; retirement; switching behavior;
Other versions of this item:
- Carine Franc & Marc Perronnin & Aur�lie Pierre, 2008. "Private Supplementary Health Insurance: Retirees' Demand," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 33(4), pages 610-626, October.
- D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
- I19 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGE-2008-04-29 (Economics of Ageing)
- NEP-ALL-2008-04-29 (All new papers)
- NEP-HEA-2008-04-29 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2008-04-29 (Insurance Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Samuelson, William & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1988. " Status Quo Bias in Decision Making," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 7-59, March.
- Zeynep Or & Chantal Cases & Melanie Lisac & Karsten Vrangbaek & Ulrika Winblad & Gwyn Bevan, 2009.
"Are Health Problems Systemic? Politics of Access and Choice under Beveridge and Bismarck Systems,"
DT27, IRDES institut for research and information in health economics, revised Sep 2009.
- Or, Zeynep & Cases, Chantal & Lisac, Melanie & Vrangbæk, Karsten & Winblad, Ulrika & Bevan, Gwyn, 2010. "Are health problems systemic? Politics of access and choice under Beveridge and Bismarck systems," Health Economics, Policy and Law, Cambridge University Press, vol. 5(03), pages 269-293, July.
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