Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this book chapter or follow this series

Tax Subsidies to Employer-Provided Health Insurance

In: Empirical Foundations of Household Taxation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Jonathan Gruber
  • James M. Poterba

Abstract

This paper investigates the current tax subsidy to employer- provided health insurance, and presents new evidence on the economic effects of various tax reforms. It argues that previous analyses have overstated the tax subsidy to employer-provided insurance by neglecting the substantial and growing importance of after-tax employee payments for employer-provided insurance, as well as the tax subsidy for extreme medical expenses, which discourages insurance purchase. Even after considering these factors, however, the net tax subsidy to employer-provided insurance is substantial, with tax factors generating an average reduction of approximately thirty percent in the price of this insurance. Reducing the tax subsidy, either by capping the value of employer-provided health insurance that could be excluded from taxation, or eliminating the exclusion entirely, would have substantial effects on the level of employer- provided insurance and on tax revenues.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6239.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

as in new window

This chapter was published in:

  • Martin Feldstein & James M. Poterba, 1996. "Empirical Foundations of Household Taxation," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number feld96-1, May.
    This item is provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Chapters with number 6239.

    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:6239

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
    Phone: 617-868-3900
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.nber.org
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords:

    Other versions of this item:

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Marquis, M Susan & Phelps, Charles E, 1987. "Price Elasticity and Adverse Selection in the Demand for Supplementary Health Insurance," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(2), pages 299-313, April.
    2. Jonathan Gruber & Alan B. Krueger, 1990. "The Incidence of Mandated Employer-Provided Insurance: Lessons from Workers' Compensation Insurance," NBER Working Papers 3557, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Louis Kaplow, 1991. "The Income Tax as Insurance: The Casualty Loss and Medical Expense Deductions and the Exclusion of the Medical Insurance Premiums," NBER Working Papers 3723, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Burman, Leonard E. & Williams, Roberton, 1994. "Tax Caps on Employment-Based Health Insurance," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 47(3), pages 529-45, September.
    5. Long, James E & Scott, Frank A, 1982. "The Income Tax and Nonwage Compensation," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 64(2), pages 211-19, May.
    6. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
    7. Holmer, Martin, 1984. "Tax policy and the demand for health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 203-221, December.
    8. Stephen A. Woodbury & Daniel S. Hamermesh, . "Taxes, Fringe Benefits, and Faculty," Upjohn Working Papers and Journal Articles saw1992, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    9. Feldstein, Martin & Samwick, Andrew A., 1992. "Social Security Rules and Marginal Tax Rates," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 45(1), pages 1-22, March.
    10. Kaplow, Louis, 1992. "Income Tax Deductions for Losses as Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(4), pages 1013-17, September.
    11. Feldstein, Martin S, 1973. "The Welfare Loss of Excess Health Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(2), pages 251-80, Part I, M.
    12. Woodbury, Stephen A, 1983. "Substitution between Wage and Nonwage Benefits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(1), pages 166-82, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Selin, Håkan, 2009. "Marginal tax rates and tax-favoured pension savings of the selfemployed Evidence from Sweden," Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies 2009:4, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
    2. Sewell, David, 1997. "Shifting responsibility for social services as enterprises privatize in Belarus," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1719, The World Bank.
    3. Jonathan Gruber, 2002. "Taxes and Health Insurance," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 16, pages 37-66 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Brown, Samuel & Gale, William G., 2012. "Tax Reform for Growth, Equity, and Revenue," MPRA Paper 55056, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. David M. Cutler, 1996. "Public Policy for Health Care," NBER Working Papers 5591, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Thomas Selden, 2008. "The effect of tax subsidies on high health care expenditure burdens in the United States," International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 209-223, September.
    7. Jonathan Gruber & Michael Lettau, 2000. "How Elastic is the Firm's Demand for Health Insurance?," NBER Working Papers 8021, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Zabinski, Daniel & Selden, Thomas M. & Moeller, John F. & Banthin, Jessica S., 1999. "Medical savings accounts: microsimulation results from a model with adverse selection," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 195-218, April.
    9. Dizioli, Allan & Pinheiro, Roberto B., 2012. "Health insurance as a productive factor," MPRA Paper 39743, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Miller, Nolan H., 2005. "Pricing health benefits: A cost-minimization approach," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(5), pages 931-949, September.
    11. Janet Currie & Aaron Yelowitz, 1999. "Health Insurance and Less Skilled Workers," NBER Working Papers 7291, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:6239. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.