Self Selection and Moral Hazard in Chilean Health Insurance
AbstractIn Chile, dependant workers are mandated to purchase health insurance and they can chose between one public provider and several private providers. Here, we analyze the relation between utilization and the choice of either private or public insurance. Independent workers, however, are not mandated. In this case, we analyze the relationship between utilization and the decision to purchase insurance. The results show adverse selection against insurance companies for independent workers and against FONASA for dependant workers. Moral hazard is negligible in the case of hospitalization. Regarding medical visits, over consumption is quantitatively important and statistically significant in all cases (against insurance for independents; against public and private insurance in the case of dependant workers).
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Instituto de Economia. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its series Documentos de Trabajo with number 195.
Date of creation: 2001
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published as "Self Selection and Moral Hazard in Chilean Health Insurance", Journal of Health Economics, Volume 22, Issue 3, May 2003, pp. 459-476.
Insurance; moral hazard; adverse selection; self selection; count data models;
Other versions of this item:
- Sapelli, Claudio & Vial, Bernardita, 2003. "Self-selection and moral hazard in Chilean health insurance," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 459-476, May.
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
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