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Who's Getting the Office? Autocracy And Elected Politicians' Career Path: Evidence from the Mexican States

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  • Julio Alberto Ramos-Pastrana

    (Indiana University)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the effect of autocracy on governors' career path. Using data from the Mexican states in the period 1995 to 2014, I exploit the variation provided by an exogenous political transition. Results show that autocratic states that experienced a transition elected governors that had 37.3 percentage points more technical or administrative experience than those governors from autocratic states that did not go through a transition. This finding supports the argument that autocratic regimes incentivize Mexican governors from the dominant party to pursue political careers, while candidates from the opposition parties choose careers with a technical or administrative focus.

Suggested Citation

  • Julio Alberto Ramos-Pastrana, 2017. "Who's Getting the Office? Autocracy And Elected Politicians' Career Path: Evidence from the Mexican States," CAEPR Working Papers 2017-008, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
    • Handle: RePEc:inu:caeprp:2017008
    as

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    File URL: https://caepr.indiana.edu/RePEc/inu/caeprp/caepr2017-008.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Autocracy; Politicians' Career Path; Political Institutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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