Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India
AbstractWe develop a framework to empirically examine how politicians with electoral pressures control bureaucrats with career concerns and the consequent implications for bureaucrats' career investments. Unique microlevel data on Indian bureaucrats support our key predictions. Politicians use frequent reassignments (transfers) across posts of varying importance to control bureaucrats. High-skilled bureaucrats face less frequent political transfers and lower variability in the importance of their posts. We find evidence of two alternative paths to career success: officers of higher initial ability are more likely to invest in skill, but caste affinity to the politician's party base also helps secure important positions. © 2012 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal Review of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): 94 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/
Other versions of this item:
- Lakshmi Iyer & Anandi Mani, 2008. "Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India," Working Papers id:1781, eSocialSciences.
- Iyer, Lakshmi; Mani, Anandi, 2010. "Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 24, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Ernesto Calvo & Gergely Ujhelyi, 2012. "Political Screening: Theory and Evidence from the Argentine Public Sector," Working Papers 201303201, Department of Economics, University of Houston.
- Thomas Braendle, 2012. "Determinants of Employment in the Ministerial Bureaucracy," Working papers 2012/01, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
- Pinghan Liang, 2010. "Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000139, David K. Levine.
- Gergely Ujhelyi, 2013. "Civil Service Rules and Policy Choices: Evidence from US State Governments," Working Papers 201303249, Department of Economics, University of Houston.
- Claire Lim, 2009. "Turnover and Accountability of Appointed and Elected Judges," 2009 Meeting Papers 190, Society for Economic Dynamics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Karie Kirkpatrick).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.