Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India
AbstractPoliticians face high-powered electoral pressures while bureaucrats face longer-term, low powered incentives. Given constitutional constraints, what incentives do politicians employ to control bureaucrats and how do bureaucrats respond to such incentives? These issues are addressed using a sample model where politicians use posts of varying importance to motivate bureaucrats, who respond by investing in skill or political loyalty to get important posts. Using data from the Indian Administrative Service, evidence for several key implications upon entering office are analysed. [WP no. 178].
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by eSocialSciences in its series Working Papers with number id:1781.
Date of creation: Dec 2008
Date of revision:
Note: Institutional Papers
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.esocialsciences.org
India; politicians; political; Indian; policy implementation; outcomes; electoral; bureaucrats; incentives; travelling; constitutional constraints; bureaucracy; data;
Other versions of this item:
- Lakshmi Iyer & Anandi Mani, 2012. "Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 94(3), pages 723-739, August.
- Iyer, Lakshmi; Mani, Anandi, 2010. "Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 24, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
- H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Claire Lim, 2009. "Turnover and Accountability of Appointed and Elected Judges," 2009 Meeting Papers 190, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Ernesto Calvo & Gergely Ujhelyi, 2012. "Political Screening: Theory and Evidence from the Argentine Public Sector," Working Papers 201303201, Department of Economics, University of Houston.
- Gergely Ujhelyi, 2013. "Civil Service Rules and Policy Choices: Evidence from US State Governments," Working Papers 201303249, Department of Economics, University of Houston.
- Pinghan Liang, 2010. "Transfer of Authority within Hierarchy," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000139, David K. Levine.
- Thomas Braendle, 2012. "Determinants of Employment in the Ministerial Bureaucracy," Working papers 2012/01, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Padma Prakash).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.