Helena Hye-Young Kim () (Department of Economics, Korea University) Frans Spinnewyn (Department of Economic, K.U.Leuven) Luc Lauwers (Department of Economic, K.U.Leuven)
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We investigate the mechanism that provides the optimal decision rule for two agents making joint decisions. It is shown that, a special rectangular mechanism with two sided screening, elicit correct information when agents?preferences are private information. Such mechanism is presented as a game of incomplete information. It is shown that if types are uniformly distributed, then a three stage sequential game with an exogenously given probability of a terminal break down cannot be improved upon within a restricted class of models.
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Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Korea University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number
0710.