Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Gradual Revelation Mechanism with Two-Sided Screening

Contents:

Author Info

  • Helena Hye-Young Kim

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Korea University)

  • Frans Spinnewyn

    (Department of Economic, K.U.Leuven)

  • Luc Lauwers

    (Department of Economic, K.U.Leuven)

Abstract

We investigate the mechanism that provides the optimal decision rule for two agents making joint decisions. It is shown that, a special rectangular mechanism with two sided screening, elicit correct information when agents?preferences are private information. Such mechanism is presented as a game of incomplete information. It is shown that if types are uniformly distributed, then a three stage sequential game with an exogenously given probability of a terminal break down cannot be improved upon within a restricted class of models.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econ.korea.ac.kr/~ri/WorkingPapers/W0710.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute of Economic Research, Korea University in its series Discussion Paper Series with number 0710.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iek:wpaper:0710

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1-5-Ga, Anam-dong, Sung buk-ku, Seoul, 136-701
Phone: (82-2)3290-1633
Fax: (82-2) 928-4948
Web page: http://econ.korea.ac.kr/~ri
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Mechanism Design; Efficiency; Risk Limit;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Wolinsky, Asher, 1990. "Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(1), pages 1-23, January.
  2. Myerson, Roger B, 1984. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 52(2), pages 461-87, March.
  3. d'Aspremont, Claude & Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre, 1979. "Incentives and incomplete information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 25-45, February.
  4. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Abreu Dilip & Matsushima Hitoshi, 1994. "Exact Implementation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-19, October.
  6. Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1990. "Strategic Information Revelation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 25-47, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iek:wpaper:0710. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kim, Jisoo).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.