This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Performance Payments for Environmental Services : Lessons from Economic Theory on the Strength of Incentives in the Presence of Performance Risk and Performance Measurement Distortion

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Astrid Zabel () (Environmental Policy and Economics PEPE, Institute for Environmental Decisions IED, ETH Zurich)
Brian Roe (Department of Agricultural, Environmental and Development Economics, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA)
Abstract

Payments for environmental services (PES) schemes have become an increasingly accepted and popular mode for governmental and non-governmental agencies to use in addressing local and regional declines in ecosystem services. A defining characteristic of performance payments, a sub-category of PES schemes, is the linking of individual payments to environmental outputs themselves rather than to the inputs that affect the production of environmental services. Such a focus raises several practical issues during implementation. We review and translate key aspects of the economic theory of incentives into the context of performance payments schemes with special attention paid to two practical issues. The first is that of structuring individual incentives to account for risks outside the individual’s control such as weather that can affect the level of environmental services generated. The second deals with the possibility of distortion in the measurements of environmental services used to determine individual payments under PES schemes. Each challenge is accompanied by a discussion of advice based upon economic theory and a discussion of examples from different countries where such implementation issues arise.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ied.ethz.ch/pub/pdf/IED_WP07_Zabel_Roe.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by IED Institute for Environmental Decisions, ETH Zurich in its series IED Working paper with number 09-07.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ied:wpsied:09-07

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Weinbergstrasse 35, CH-8092 Z�rich
Phone: +41 44 632 41 28
Fax: +41 44 632 12 18
Email:
Web page: http://www.ied.ethz.ch
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: Optimal Incentive Contracts; Payments for Environmental Services; Performance Incentives; Distortion;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Theofanis Tsoulouhas & Kosmas Marinakis, 2007. "Tournaments with Ex Post Heterogeneous Agents," Working Paper Series 015, North Carolina State University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Frank Wätzold & Martin Drechsler, 2005. "Spatially Uniform versus Spatially Heterogeneous Compensation Payments for Biodiversity-Enhancing Land-Use Measures," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(1), pages 73-93, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Wunder, Sven & Engel, Stefanie & Pagiola, Stefano, 2008. "Taking stock: A comparative analysis of payments for environmental services programs in developed and developing countries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(4), pages 834-852, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Pagiola, Stefano & Ramirez, Elias & Gobbi, Jose & de Haan, Cees & Ibrahim, Muhammad & Murgueitio, Enrique & Ruiz, Juan Pablo, 2007. "Paying for the environmental services of silvopastoral practices in Nicaragua," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 374-385, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Canice Prendergast, 2002. "The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 1071-1102, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? It is the publishers that input data about their publications, as there is no staff at RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-11.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.