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Rotación de presidentes ejecutivos y directores en Venezuela

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  • Urbi Garay
  • Maximiliano González
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    Abstract

    (Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) El propósito de este estudio es propiciar una mejor comprensión de las estructuras y los mecanismos de conducción empresarial fuera de Estados Unidos, observando una economía emergente específica: Venezuela. Primero formulamos un índice de prácticas de conducción empresarial de las compañías inscritas en bolsa, cuyos resultados generales indican que Venezuela exhibe puntajes de gestión empresarial relativamente bajos. Descubrimos, empleando esta muestra limitada, que existe una relación positiva entre este índice de conducción empresarial y sus subcomponentes y mediciones alternativas de valor (coeficiente de Tobin, relación precio/valor contable y pago de dividendos). En este entorno, caracterizado por un mercado financiero subdesarrollado, un sistema jurídico débil, una aplicación precaria de la normativa legal y una elevada concentración de la propiedad, abordamos la cuestión de si el sistema de conducción empresarial funciona en lo absoluto en Venezuela. Nos interesa especialmente estudiar las siguientes dos cuestiones, las cuales constituyen condiciones necesarias para el buen funcionamiento de cualquier sistema de conducción empresarial. En primer lugar, ¿es más probable que presidentes ejecutivos de desempeño deslucido pierdan su cargo que sus colegas de mejor desempeño? En segundo lugar, ¿le corresponde a la junta directiva la tarea de vigilar al presidente ejecutivo o simplemente cumplir una labor de asesoría? A tal fin, recabamos información detallada de 51 compañías venezolanas durante el período de 1984 a 2002. Una vez controladas características relacionadas con el presidente ejecutivo, la junta directiva, la propiedad, las empresas y los períodos abarcados, hallamos que el desempeño financiero precario hace aumentar considerablemente la probabilidad de la rotación de presidentes ejecutivos y directores. Los elementos de juicio empíricos también se corresponden con la idea de que, en Venezuela, los directores desempeñan principalmente una función de asesoría y no de vigilancia de la labor del presidente ejecutivo.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department in its series Research Department Publications with number 3215.

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    Date of creation: Nov 2005
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    Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:3215

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    1. Demirguc-Kunt, Ash & Levine, Ross, 1996. "Stock Market Development and Financial Intermediaries: Stylized Facts," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 10(2), pages 291-321, May.
    2. Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January.
    3. Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
    4. Anil Shivdasani & David Yermack, 1999. "CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(5), pages 1829-1853, October.
    5. Gibson, Michael S., 2003. "Is Corporate Governance Ineffective in Emerging Markets?," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(01), pages 231-250, March.
    6. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon, 1999. "Enterprise performance and management turnover in the Czech Republic," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 1115-1124, April.
    7. Himmelberg, Charles P. & Hubbard, R. Glenn & Palia, Darius, 1999. "Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 353-384, September.
    8. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January.
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