Cheap Talk in the Classroom
AbstractIn this paper, I o¤er a theoretical explanation of the robust gender differences in educational achievement distributions of school children. I consider a one shot cheap talk game with two different types of senders (biased teachers and fair teachers), two types of receivers ("normal" and "special" pupils) and uncertainty about the sender type on the side of the receiver. I demonstrate that the group of pupils who, in expectation, get either too much or too little encouragement will have less top achievers and a lower average achievement than the group of pupils who get a more accurate feedback message, even if the prior talent distribution is the same for both groups of pupils.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany in its series SFB 649 Discussion Papers with number SFB649DP2006-019.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2006
Date of revision:
Cheap talk; Education; Discrimination; Gender;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
- J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-04-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2006-04-08 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EDU-2006-04-08 (Education)
- NEP-EXP-2006-04-08 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-URE-2006-04-08 (Urban & Real Estate Economics)
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