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Cheap Talk in the Classroom

Author

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  • Lydia Mechtenberg

Abstract

In this paper, I o¤er a theoretical explanation of the robust gender differences in educational achievement distributions of school children. I consider a one shot cheap talk game with two different types of senders (biased teachers and fair teachers), two types of receivers ("normal" and "special" pupils) and uncertainty about the sender type on the side of the receiver. I demonstrate that the group of pupils who, in expectation, get either too much or too little encouragement will have less top achievers and a lower average achievement than the group of pupils who get a more accurate feedback message, even if the prior talent distribution is the same for both groups of pupils.

Suggested Citation

  • Lydia Mechtenberg, 2006. "Cheap Talk in the Classroom," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2006-019, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:hum:wpaper:sfb649dp2006-019
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    File URL: http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/papers/pdf/SFB649DP2006-019.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Joel Sobel, 1985. "A Theory of Credibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(4), pages 557-573.
    6. Lavy, Victor, 2008. "Do gender stereotypes reduce girls' or boys' human capital outcomes? Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 2083-2105, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Simon Burgess & Ellen Greaves, 2013. "Test Scores, Subjective Assessment, and Stereotyping of Ethnic Minorities," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(3), pages 535-576.
    2. Schwager, Robert, 2012. "Grade inflation, social background, and labour market matching," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 56-66.
    3. Ehlers, Tim & Schwager, Robert, 2012. "Honest Grading, Grade Inflation and Reputation," VfS Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century 62051, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Robert Schwager, 2018. "Majority Vote on Educational Standards," CESifo Working Paper Series 6845, CESifo.
    5. repec:got:cegedp:143 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Coenen, J. & Van Klaveren, C., 2013. "Better test scores with a same-gender teacher?," Working Papers 47, Top Institute for Evidence Based Education Research.
    7. Schwager, Robert, 2013. "Majority Vote on Educational Standards," VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79971, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    8. Ehlers, Tim & Schwager, Robert, 2012. "Honest grading, grade inflation and reputation," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 143, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cheap talk; Education; Discrimination; Gender;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • I21 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Analysis of Education
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination

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