Evolutionary Dynamics for Large Populations in Games with Multiple Backward Induction Equilibria
AbstractThis work follows “Evolutionary dynamics and backward induction” (Hart ) in the study of dynamic models consisting of selection and mutation, when the mutation rate is low and the populations are large. Under the assumption that there is a single backward induction (or subgame perfect) equilibrium of a perfect information game, Hart  proved that this point is the only stable state. In this work, we examine the case where there are multiple backward induction equilibria.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University, Jerusalem in its series Discussion Paper Series with number dp402.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: Sep 2005
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-09-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2005-09-11 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2005-09-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2005-09-11 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sergiu Hart, 1999.
"Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction,"
Game Theory and Information
9905002, EconWPA, revised 23 Mar 2000.
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