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Natural Implementation with Semi-responsible-sincere Agents in Pure Exchange Economies

Author

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  • Lombardi, Michele
  • Yoshihara, Naoki
  • 吉原, 直毅

Abstract

We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies when agents have intrinsic preferences for responsible-sincerity. An agent has an intrinsic preference for responsible-sincerity if she cares about truth-telling that is in line with the goal of the mechanism designer besides her material well-being. A semi-responsible-sincere agent is an agent who, given what her opponents do, acts in a non-responsible-sincere manner when a responsible-sincere behavior poses obstacles to her material well-being. The class of e¢ cient allocation rules that are Nash implementable is identi.ed provided that there is at least one agent who is semi-responsible-sincere. The Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class.

Suggested Citation

  • Lombardi, Michele & Yoshihara, Naoki & 吉原, 直毅, 2016. "Natural Implementation with Semi-responsible-sincere Agents in Pure Exchange Economies," Discussion Paper Series 649, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    • Handle: RePEc:hit:hituec:649
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2012. "Nash implementation with partially honest individuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 154-169.
    2. Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1998. "Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 157-173, April.
    3. Olivier Bochet, 2007. "Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(2), pages 301-316, October.
    4. Luis Corchón & Carmen Herrero, 2004. "A decent proposal," Spanish Economic Review, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 107-125, July.
    5. Matthew O. Jackson, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 757-775.
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    Cited by:

    1. Doğan, Battal, 2017. "Eliciting the socially optimal allocation from responsible agents," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 103-110.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash equilibrium; exchange economies; intrinsic preferences for responsible-sincerity; boundary problem; price-quantity mechanism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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