IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hig/wpaper/19-pa-2014.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Effects Of Regulatory Reforms On Public Procurement: The Case Of A National University In Russia

Author

Listed:
  • Andrey V. Tkachenko

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Andrei A. Yakovlev

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Olga A. Demidova

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

  • Irina O. Volmenskikh

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

This paper analyses the impact of reform and different regulation regimes on the effectiveness of procurement at a large state university in the period from 2008 to 2012. We evaluate the impact on the procurement effectiveness parameters of two significant changes in the public procurement regulations: transfer to electronic auctions from 2010 under the Federal Law and the adoption by this organization of its own Procurement Provision from 2011. We show that transfer to electronic auctions leads to higher competition and more significant price decreases, whereas the adoption of Procurement provision has the opposite effect. Regarding delays in contract execution, the first reform has no effect and the second regulation change results in decreasing delays.

Suggested Citation

  • Andrey V. Tkachenko & Andrei A. Yakovlev & Olga A. Demidova & Irina O. Volmenskikh, 2014. "The Effects Of Regulatory Reforms On Public Procurement: The Case Of A National University In Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 19/PA/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:19/pa/2014
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.hse.ru/data/2014/10/31/1102554190/19PA2014.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marian W. Moszoro & Pablo T. Spiller, 2012. "Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts," NBER Working Papers 18636, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Gregory Lewis & Patrick Bajari, 2011. "Procurement Contracting With Time Incentives: Theory and Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 126(3), pages 1173-1211.
    3. Max Rolfstam, 2009. "Public procurement as an innovation policy tool: The role of institutions," Science and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 36(5), pages 349-360, June.
    4. Hiroshi Ohashi, 2009. "Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of Municipal Public Works," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 34(3), pages 267-285, May.
    5. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Lamarche, Carlos, 2009. "The effect of information on the bidding and survival of entrants in procurement auctions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 56-72, February.
    6. Klemperer, Paul, 2002. "How (not) to run auctions: The European 3G telecom auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 829-845, May.
    7. Dakshina De Silva & Georgia Kosmopoulou & Beatrice Pagel & Ronald Peeters, 2013. "The Impact of Timing on Bidding Behavior in Procurement Auctions of Contracts with Private Costs," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 42(3), pages 321-343, May.
    8. Aschhoff, Birgit & Sofka, Wolfgang, 2009. "Innovation on demand--Can public procurement drive market success of innovations?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 38(8), pages 1235-1247, October.
    9. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Dunne, Timothy & Kankanamge, Anuruddha & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2008. "The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 150-181, January.
    10. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, December.
    11. Oriana Bandiera & Andrea Prat & Tommaso Valletti, 2009. "Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(4), pages 1278-1308, September.
    12. Andrey Yakovlev & Andrey Tkachenko & Olga Demidova & Olga Balaeva, 2013. "An impact of different regulatory regimes on the effectiveness of public procurement," HSE Working papers WP BRP 08/PA/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    13. Anna Balsevich & Svetlana Pivovarova & Elena Podkolzina, 2011. "Information Transparency in Public Procurement: How it Works in Russian Regions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 01/EC/2011, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    14. Tadelis, Steven, 2012. "Public procurement design: Lessons from the private sector," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 297-302.
    15. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Auction design and favoritism," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 9-42, March.
    16. Elvira Uyarra & Kieron Flanagan, 2009. "Understanding the Innovation Impacts of Public Procurement," European Planning Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(1), pages 123-143, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Andrey Yakovlev & Andrey Tkachenko & Olga Demidova & Olga Balaeva, 2013. "An impact of different regulatory regimes on the effectiveness of public procurement," HSE Working papers WP BRP 08/PA/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    2. Andrey Tkachenko & Daniil Esaulov, 2018. "The Role Of Governors In Public Procurement," HSE Working papers WP BRP 19/PSP/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    3. Dakshina G. De Silva & Timothy Dunne & Georgia Kosmopoulou & Carlos Lamarche, 2015. "Project modifications and bidding in highway procurement auctions," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2015-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    4. RAITERI Emilio, 2015. "A time to nourish? Evaluating the impact of innovative public procurement on technological generality through patent data," Cahiers du GREThA (2007-2019) 2015-05, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée (GREThA).
    5. Hatsumi, Kentaro & Ishii, Rieko, 2022. "The effect of price on the quality of public construction in Japan," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    6. Stéphanie Boulenger & Marcelin Joanis, 2015. "Analyse économique des marchés publics dans l’industrie de la construction au Québec," CIRANO Project Reports 2015rp-23, CIRANO.
    7. Belev, S. & Veterinarov, V. & Matveev, E., 2023. "Vertical collusion in public procurement: Estimation based on data for R&D composite auctions," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 36-63.
    8. Estache, Antonio & Iimi, Atsushi, 2011. "(Un)bundling infrastructure procurement: Evidence from water supply and sewage projects," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 104-114, June.
    9. Atsushi Iimi, 2013. "Testing Low-Balling Strategy in Rural Road Procurement," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 43(3), pages 243-261, November.
    10. Camboni Riccardo & Valbonesi Paola, 2021. "Incumbent and Entrant Bidding in Scoring Rule Auctions: A Study on Italian Canteen Services," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 21(1), pages 1-43, January.
    11. Andrey Tkachenko & Paola Valbonesi & Elena Shadrina & Gegam Shagbazian, 2019. "Efficient design of set-aside auctions for small businesses: an empirical analysis," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0240, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    12. Nogues Comas,Antoni Albert & Mendes Dos Santos,Nuno Filipe, 2021. "Measuring Public Procurement Rules and Practices : Benchmarking a Recurrent Infrastructure Contract," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9651, The World Bank.
    13. Ari Hyytinen & Sofia Lundberg & Otto Toivanen, 2018. "Design of public procurement auctions: evidence from cleaning contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(2), pages 398-426, June.
    14. Iossa, Elisabetta & Decarolis, Francesco & de Rassenfosse, Gaétan & Giuffrida, Leonardo Maria & Mollisi, Vincenzo & Raiteri, Emilio & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2019. "Buyers' Role in Innovation Procurement," CEPR Discussion Papers 13777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Guerzoni, Marco & Raiteri, Emilio, 2012. "Innovative public procurement and R&D Subsidies: hidden treatment and new empirical evidence on the technology policy mix in a quasi-experimental setting," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis LEI & BRICK - Laboratory of Economics of Innovation "Franco Momigliano", Bureau of Research in Innovation, Complexity and Knowledge, Collegio 201218, University of Turin.
    16. Kaplow, Louis & Shapiro, Carl, 2007. "Antitrust," Handbook of Law and Economics, in: A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell (ed.), Handbook of Law and Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 15, pages 1073-1225, Elsevier.
    17. Marcel Canoy & Patrick Rey & Eric van Damme, 2004. "Dominance and Monopolization," Chapters, in: Manfred Neumann & Jürgen Weigand (ed.), The International Handbook of Competition, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Bergman, Mats A. & Johansson, Per & Lundberg, Sofia & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2016. "Privatization and quality: Evidence from elderly care in Sweden," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 109-119.
    19. Jakob Edler & Luke Georghiou & Elvira Uyarra & Jillian Yeow, 2015. "The meaning and limitations of public procurement for innovation: a supplier’s experience," Chapters, in: Charles Edquist & Nicholas S Vonortas & Jon M Zabala-Iturriagagoitia & Jakob Edler (ed.), Public Procurement for Innovation, chapter 2, pages 35-64, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    20. Chiara D’Alpaos & Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonesi & Sergio Vergalli, 2013. "Time overruns as opportunistic behavior in public procurement," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 110(1), pages 25-43, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    public procurements; budget sector organizations; regulation; reforms; effectiveness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:19/pa/2014. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Shamil Abdulaev or Shamil Abdulaev (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/hsecoru.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.