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Institutions, Mobilization and Rebellion in Post-Colonial Societies

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  • Jean-Louis Arcand

    (The Graduate Institute, Geneva and European Union Development Network (EUDN))

  • Jean-Pierre Tranchant

    ()
    (Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex)

Abstract

We revisit the simultaneous equations model of rebellion, mobilization, grievances and repression proposed by Gurr and Moore (1997). Our main contribution is to clarify and improve on the underlying identification strategy and to emphasize the role played by the institutional environment. Instrumental variables estimates for post-colonial societies reveal that the strength of the state, as proxied empirically by an index of bureaucratic quality, exerts a strong preventive effect on rebellion. On the other hand, working institutions also influence the likelihood of rebellion indirectly, through mobilization. As such, the total net effect of state capacity on rebellion is ambiguous.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Households in Conflict Network in its series HiCN Working Papers with number 133.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2012
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Handle: RePEc:hic:wpaper:133

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