The Political Economy of Public Employment Programs
AbstractIn this paper we study the consequences of endogenous active labor market policies. In particular it is assumed that all viable policies have to please the employed majority. The main objective is to seek the answer to the following question: In what sense does the political equilibrium deviate from the welfare optimum? We find that the political process yields excessive program activity under highly plausible circumstances. Thereason for this deviation from constrained efficiency is that active labor market policy inflicts costs on firms that are ignored by the employed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 1997:6.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: 25 Jan 1997
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Public Economics, 1999, pages 487-504.
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
More information through EDIRC
Political economy; labor market programs; efficiency;
Other versions of this item:
- Fredriksson, Peter, 1999. "The political economy of public employment programs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 487-504, June.
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-1998-08-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-1998-08-31 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-LTV-1998-08-31 (Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty)
- NEP-MIC-1998-08-31 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-1998-08-31 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PKE-1998-06-03 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-POL-1998-08-31 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-1998-08-31 (Public Finance)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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