Regulation Failure and CO2-emissions: An Experimental Investigation of the Cape Town Taxi Market
AbstractEconomists often point out that regulations meant to correct market failure sometimes do more harm than good, in particular in developing countries. In this paper, I set up a field experiment to test this proposition in the Cape Town market for metered taxis. I find that if strictly enforced, the local meter regulations provide taxi drivers with an incentives to take detours in order to inflate mileage. Strict compliance to the regulations decreases the trade surplus by 10 percent and increases carbon dioxide emissions by 8 percent. Both private and environmental costs are reduced if the regulations are sidestepped and replaced by informal bargaining. I show theoretically that these results are consistent with a model where the regulations frame the informal bargaining process through the outside option. The combined results show that regulations can have unintended consequences that go well beyond local markets, but that deregulation does not necessarily achieve the first-best.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Uppsala University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series, Center for Labor Studies with number 2011:13.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 05 Dec 2011
Date of revision: 12 Aug 2013
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Postal: Department of Economics, Uppsala University, P. O. Box 513, SE-751 20 Uppsala, Sweden
Phone: + 46 18 471 25 00
Fax: + 46 18 471 14 78
Web page: http://www.nek.uu.se/
More information through EDIRC
Informal sector; Market regulations; Taxi Experiment; Incomplete Contracts; Transac- tion Costs; Institutions; Natural Field Experiment; Environmental Economics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-12-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2011-12-13 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2011-12-13 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-12-13 (Game Theory)
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