The prenucleolus for games with communication structures
Abstractt is well-known that the prenucleolus on the class of TU games is characterized by singlevaluedness, covariance under strategic equivalence, anonymity, and the reduced game property. We show that the prenucleolus on the class of TU games restricted to the connected coalitions with respect to communication structures may be characterized by the same axioms and a stronger version of independence of non-connected coalitions requiring that the solution does not depend on the worth of any non-connected coalition. Similarly as in the classical case, it turns out that each of the five axioms is logically independent of the remaining axioms and that an infinite universe of potential players is necessary. Moreover, a suitable definition and characterization of a prekernel for games with communication structures is presented.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark in its series Discussion Papers of Business and Economics with number 10/2011.
Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 10 Dec 2011
Date of revision:
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TU game; solution concept; communication and conference structure; nucleolus;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-02-08 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-02-08 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GTH-2012-02-08 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2012-02-08 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-02-08 (Microeconomics)
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