Centralized Bargaining, Multi-Tasking, and Work Incentives
AbstractThe paper examines the implications of an important aspect of the ongoing reorganization of work - the move from occupational specialization toward multi-tasking - for centralized wage bargaining. The analysis shows how, on account of this reorganization, centralized bargaining becomes increasingly inefficient and detrimental to firms' profit opportunities, since it prevents firms from offering their employees adequate incentives to perform the appropriate mix of tasks. The paper also shows how centralized bargaining inhibits firms from using wages to induce workers to learn how to use their experience from one set of tasks to enhance their performance at other tasks. In this way, the paper helps explain the increasing resistance to centralized bargaining in various advanced market economies.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 473.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 28 Dec 2012
Date of revision:
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Centralized wage bargaining; restructuring; organization of firms; technological change; information flows; employment; wage formation; unemployment;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- A00 - General Economics and Teaching - - General - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-01-07 (All new papers)
- NEP-HRM-2013-01-07 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2013-01-07 (Labour Economics)
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