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The HAMP NPV Model – Development and Early Performance

Author

Listed:
  • Steve Holden

    (Fannie Mae)

  • Austin Kelly

    (Federal Housing Finance Agency)

  • Douglas McManus

    (Freddie Mac)

  • Therese Scharlemann

    (U.S. Department of the Treasury)

  • Ryan Singer

    (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation)

  • John D. Worth

    (National Credit Union Administration)

Abstract

The foreclosure crisis that began in 2008 triggered the need for new approaches to treat distressed mortgages. A key component of the Obama Administration’s Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) was the development of a standardized Net Present Value (NPV) model to identify troubled loans that were value-enhancing candidates for payment-reducing modifications. This paper discusses the development of the HAMP NPV model, its purpose, and some important constraints that dictated its structure and limitations. We describe the structure and the estimation of the model in detail. Furthermore, we describe the responsiveness of the model to key characteristics, such as loan to value and credit score and provide new evidence on the relationship between HAMP modification performance and key borrower and modification characteristics. The paper concludes with a discussion of model limitations and suggestions for further refinement of the model.

Suggested Citation

  • Steve Holden & Austin Kelly & Douglas McManus & Therese Scharlemann & Ryan Singer & John D. Worth, 2011. "The HAMP NPV Model – Development and Early Performance," FHFA Staff Working Papers 11-01, Federal Housing Finance Agency.
    • Handle: RePEc:hfa:wpaper:11-01
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Christopher Foote & Kristopher Gerardi & Lorenz Goette & Paul Willen, 2010. "Reducing Foreclosures: No Easy Answers," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2009, Volume 24, pages 89-138, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    4. Adelino, Manuel & Gerardi, Kristopher & Willen, Paul S., 2013. "Why don't Lenders renegotiate more home mortgages? Redefaults, self-cures and securitization," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(7), pages 835-853.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jun Zhu & Jared Janowiak & Lu Ji & Kadiri Karamon & Douglas McManus, 2015. "The Effect of Mortgage Payment Reduction on Default: Evidence from the Home Affordable Refinance Program," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 43(4), pages 1035-1054, November.
    2. Aydin, Deniz, 2021. "Forbearance, Interest Rates, and Present-Value Effects in a Randomized Debt Relief Experiment," EconStor Preprints 248467, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    3. Wayne Passmore & Shane M. Sherlund, 2016. "FHA, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Great Recession," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-031, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    4. W. Scott Frame, 2015. "Introduction to Special Issue: Government Involvement in Residential Mortgage Markets," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 43(4), pages 807-819, November.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D18 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Protection
    • R21 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Housing Demand
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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