Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

A family of simple paternalistic transfer models

Contents:

Author Info

  • Andras Simonovits

    ()
    (Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences also Mathematical Institute, Budapest University of Technology, and Department of Economics, CEU)

Abstract

A general framework is analyzed which contains several special transfer (tax and pension) models. In our static two-overlapping-generation framework, every individual works in the first stage of the adult age, while is retired in the second. The government operates a balanced linear transfer system, sometimes with caps. In the models, the individuals may optimize their situation in various ways: contributing to voluntary pension, restraining labor supply and underreporting wages. Individuals are typically short-sighted, therefore they choose paternalistically suboptimal decisions. The models provide useful information on the socially optimal paternalistic transfer system.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econ.core.hu/file/download/mtdp/MTDP1324.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences in its series IEHAS Discussion Papers with number 1324.

as in new window
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Aug 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:1324

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1112 Budapest, Budaorsi ut 45.
Phone: (+36-1) 309-2652
Fax: (36-1) 319-3136
Web page: http://econ.core.hu
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: tax systems; pension systems; pension models; overlapping generations; paternalism;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Hans Fehr & Fabian Kindermann, 2009. "Pension Funding and Individual Accounts in Economies with Life-cyclers and Myopes," CESifo Working Paper Series 2724, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. " The Political Economy of Social Security," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(3), pages 503-22, June.
  3. Philipp Doerrenberg & Denvil Duncan & Clemens Fuest & Andreas Peichl, 2012. "Nice Guys Finish Last: Are People with Higher Tax Morale Taxed more Heavily?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3858, CESifo Group Munich.
  4. Martin Neil Baily & Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, 2009. "US Pension Reform: Lessons from Other Countries," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4259, July.
  5. Andras Simonovits, 2012. "Optimal Cap on Pension Contributions," IEHAS Discussion Papers, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 1208, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  6. Philippe Weil, 2008. "Overlapping generations: the first jubilee," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/13430, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  7. Simonovits, András, 2011. "When are voluntary pensions indifferent?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 111(2), pages 155-157, May.
  8. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, 2003. "Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 48(Jun).
  9. Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2011. "Myopia, redistribution and pensions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 165-175, February.
  10. Andras Simonovits, 2012. "Means-tested or Flat Pension? Pension Credit," IEHAS Discussion Papers, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 1221, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  11. Andras Simonovits, 2013. "Does Higher Tax Morale Imply Higher Optimal Labor Income Tax Rate?," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 2, pages 97-114, June.
  12. Frey, Bruno S. & Weck-Hanneman, Hannelore, 1984. "The hidden economy as an 'unobserved' variable," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(1-2), pages 33-53.
  13. Andras Simonovits, 2012. "Optimal linear redistributive tax and pension systems with flexible labor supply," IEHAS Discussion Papers, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 1233, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  14. Andras Simonovits, 2009. "Underreported earnings and age-specific income redistribution in post-socialist economies," IEHAS Discussion Papers, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 0927, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  15. van Groezen, Bas & Leers, Theo & Meijdam, Lex, 2003. "Social security and endogenous fertility: pensions and child allowances as siamese twins," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 233-251, February.
  16. Andras Simonovits, 2011. "Higher tax morale implies a higher optimal income tax rate," IEHAS Discussion Papers, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 1137, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  17. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
  18. Andras Simonovits, 2009. "When and How to Subsidize Tax-Favored Retirement Accounts?," IEHAS Discussion Papers, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 0902, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  19. repec:reg:wpaper:320 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Andersen, Torben M., 2012. "Fiscal sustainability and demographics – Should we save or work more?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 264-280.
  21. Emmanuel Saez & Joel B. Slemrod & Seth H. Giertz, 2009. "The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review," NBER Working Papers 15012, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, 2002. "Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 40(2), pages 351-401, June.
  23. Varian, Hal R., 1980. "Redistributive taxation as social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-68, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:has:discpr:1324. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Adrienn Foldi).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.