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When and How to Subsidize Tax-Favored Retirement Accounts?

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Author Info
Andras Simonovits () (Institute of Economics - Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Department of Economics - CEU, Mathematical Institute - Budapest University of Technology)

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Abstract

When and how to subsidize tax-favored pension accounts? To defend myopic workers against themselves, the government introduces a mandatory system but to help savers, it adds taxfavored retirement accounts. If the mandatory system is progressive, then a proportional voluntary system can beneficially dampen the redistribution. If the mandatory system is proportional, then a progressive voluntary system may raise the old-age consumption of the lower-paid. But if both the mandatory and the voluntary systems are proportional and the ceiling is high (as is the case in Hungary), then the latter does not diminish the tension of the mandatory system.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences in its series IEHAS Discussion Papers with number 0902.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:has:discpr:0902

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Related research
Keywords: mandatory pensions; tax-favored retirement accounts; voluntary contributions; subsidies;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving

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  1. Hans Fehr & Christian Habermann & Fabian Kindermann, 2006. "Tax-Favored Retirement Accounts: Are they Efficient in Increasing Savings and Growth?," Working Papers 012, Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Disney Richard, 2004. "Are contributions to public pension programmes a tax on employment?," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 19(39), pages 267-311, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hubbard, R Glenn & Skinner, Jonathan S, 1996. "Assessing the Effectiveness of Saving Incentives," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 73-90, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. B. Douglas Bernheim, 1999. "Taxation and Saving," Working Papers 99007, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Diamond, Peter & Koszegi, Botond, 2003. "Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 1839-1872, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Mirco Tonin, 2007. "Minimum Wage and Tax Evasion: Theory and Evidence," IEHAS Discussion Papers 0701, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. [Downloadable!]
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  7. James Sefton & Justin vandeVen & Martin Weale, 2008. "Means Testing Retirement Benefits: fostering equity or discouraging savings?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 118(528), pages 556-590, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. B?Rsch-Supan, Axel & Reil-Held, Anette & Schunk, Daniel, 2008. "Saving incentives, old-age provision and displacement effects: evidence from the recent German pension reform," Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, Cambridge University Press, vol. 7(03), pages 295-319, November. [Downloadable!]
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