IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/wpaper/hal-03759869.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Les causes économiques et politiques de la crise financière de 2008

Author

Listed:
  • Marie Daumal

    (LED - Laboratoire d'Economie Dionysien - UP8 - Université Paris 8 Vincennes-Saint-Denis)

Abstract

En octobre 2008, le système financier des Etats-Unis d'Amérique se trouvait au bord de l'effondrement. De grandes banques auraient fait faillite sans l'aide financière massive du gouvernement américain. La littérature économique, composée de rapports officiels, de livres et d'articles académiques, a tenté d'identifier les causes de la crise financière de 2008 : une déréglementation inappropriée du système financier et bancaire, une supervision faible du système de la part des régulateurs, une prise de risque excessive des banques conjuguée à un effet de levier trop élevé, des inégalités croissantes aux Etats-Unis, etc. Notre travail est composé de deux parties. Dans la première, nous avons réalisé une synthèse sur les causes économiques de la crise de 2008 en nous basant sur le rapport d'enquête des autorités fédérales américaines -intitulé "Report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission"-, sur les documents publiés par le Fonds Monétaire International après 2008 ainsi que sur le livre du Prix Nobel d'économie, M. Joseph Stiglitz. La seconde partie aborde les causes politiques de la crise. L'idéologie dominante « pro-marché », les financements de campagnes électorales par le secteur financier privé, les activités de lobbying ainsi que les allers-retours professionnels des politiques entre Wall Street et Washington pourraient expliquer en grande partie la déréglementation inappropriée du système financier américain intervenue entre les années 1980 et 2008, ayant conduit à cette crise.

Suggested Citation

  • Marie Daumal, 2022. "Les causes économiques et politiques de la crise financière de 2008," Working Papers hal-03759869, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03759869
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-03759869
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hal.science/hal-03759869/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
    2. Stratmann, Thomas, 2002. "Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 345-373, October.
    3. Mr. Zoltan Pozsar, 2011. "Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin Dilemma of the U.S. Banking System," IMF Working Papers 2011/190, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Bucks, Brian & Pence, Karen, 2008. "Do borrowers know their mortgage terms?," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 218-233, September.
    5. Deniz Igan & Prachi Mishra & Thierry Tressel, 2012. "A Fistful of Dollars: Lobbying and the Financial Crisis," NBER Macroeconomics Annual, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(1), pages 195-230.
    6. Acemoglu, Daron & Johnson, Simon & Kermani, Amir & Kwak, James & Mitton, Todd, 2016. "The value of connections in turbulent times: Evidence from the United States," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(2), pages 368-391.
    7. Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, 2016. "Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 60(3), pages 545-558, July.
    8. Thomas Stratmann, 2005. "Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 135-156, July.
    9. Andrew W. Lo, 2012. "Reading about the Financial Crisis: A Twenty-One-Book Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 50(1), pages 151-178, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Marie Daumal, 2021. "The economic and political causes of the U.S. 2008 financial crisis [Les causes économiques et politiques de la crise financière de 2008]," Working Papers hal-03261070, HAL.
    2. Michael Dorsch, 2013. "Bailout for sale? The vote to save Wall Street," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 155(3), pages 211-228, June.
    3. Ms. Deniz O Igan & Thomas Lambert, 2019. "Bank Lobbying: Regulatory Capture and Beyond," IMF Working Papers 2019/171, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Balles, Patrick & Matter, Ulrich & Stutzer, Alois, 2018. "Special Interest Groups Versus Voters and the Political Economics of Attention," Economics Working Paper Series 1813, University of St. Gallen, School of Economics and Political Science.
    5. Aggey Semenov & Hector Perez Saiz, 2014. "The Effect Of Campaign Contributions On State Banking Regulation And Bank Expansion In U.S," 2014 Meeting Papers 1265, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    6. Ovtchinnikov, Alexei V. & Pantaleoni, Eva, 2012. "Individual political contributions and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 367-392.
    7. Woon Leong Lin, 2018. "Do Firm’s Organisational Slacks Influence the Relationship between Corporate Lobbying and Corporate Financial Performance? More Is Not Always Better," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 7(1), pages 1-23, December.
    8. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2010. "The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 1967-1998, December.
    9. Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler, 2013. "Corporate campaign contributions and abnormal stock returns after presidential elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 285-307, July.
    10. Ulrich Matter & Paolo Roberti & Michaela Slotwinski, 2019. "Vote Buying in the US Congress," CESifo Working Paper Series 7841, CESifo.
    11. Polk Andreas, 2020. "What do we Know About Lobbying in Germany?," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 71(1), pages 43-79, April.
    12. Chu, Yongqiang & Zhang, Tim, 2022. "Political influence and banks: Evidence from mortgage lending," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    13. Daniel Albalate & Germà Bel & Francisco González-Gómez & Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo, 2017. "Weakening political connections by means of regulatory reform: Evidence from contracting out water services in Spain," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 211-235, October.
    14. Jackowicz, Krzysztof & Kozłowski, Łukasz & Podgórski, Błażej & Winkler-Drews, Tadeusz, 2020. "Do political connections shield from negative shocks? Evidence from rating changes in advanced emerging economies," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    15. Ramirez Carlos D., 2011. "The $700 Billion Bailout: A Public-Choice Interpretation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 291-318, November.
    16. Hideo Konishi & Chen-Yu Pan, 2020. "Silent promotion of agendas: campaign contributions and ideological polarization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 93-117, January.
    17. Alexander Fink, 2017. "Donations to Political Parties: Investing Corporations and Consuming Individuals?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 220-255, May.
    18. Bombardini, Matilde & Trebbi, Francesco, 2011. "Votes or money? Theory and evidence from the US Congress," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 587-611.
    19. Bruno Carvalho, 2021. "Campaign Spending in Local Elections: the Effects of Public Funding," Working Papers ECARES 2021-30, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    20. Mian, Atif & Sufi, Amir & Trebbi, Francesco, 2013. "The Political Economy of the Subprime Mortgage Credit Expansion," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 8(4), pages 373-408, October.

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03759869. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.