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The Value of Connections in Turbulent Times: Evidence from the United States

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Listed:
  • Daron Acemoglu
  • Simon Johnson
  • Amir Kermani
  • James Kwak
  • Todd Mitton

Abstract

The announcement of Timothy Geithner as nominee for Treasury Secretary in November 2008 produced a cumulative abnormal return for financial firms with which he had a connection. This return was about 6% after the first full day of trading and about 12% after ten trading days. There were subsequently abnormal negative returns for connected firms when news broke that Geithner's confirmation might be derailed by tax issues. Excess returns for connected firms may reflect the perceived impact of relying on the advice of a small network of financial sector executives during a time of acute crisis and heightened policy discretion.

Suggested Citation

  • Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & Amir Kermani & James Kwak & Todd Mitton, 2013. "The Value of Connections in Turbulent Times: Evidence from the United States," NBER Working Papers 19701, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19701
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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