Economic Science and Political Influence
AbstractWhen policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who design the model have an incentive to alter it in order infuence outcomes in a fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze the role of measurement infrastructures such as national statisticall institutes, the extent to which intellectual competition between di¤erent schools of thought may lead to polarization of views over some parameters and at the same time to consensus over other parameters, and .nally how the attempt to preserve in.uence can lead to degenerative research programs.
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Date of creation: Nov 2012
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Ideology ; Macroeconomic Modelling ; Self-con.rming equilibria ; Polarization ; Autocoherent Models ; Intellectual Competition ; Degenerative Research Programs ; Identification;
Other versions of this item:
- Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2012. "Economic Science and Political Influence," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) 12-365, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2012. "Economic Science and Political Influence," IZA Discussion Papers 7120, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Saint-Paul, Gilles, 2012. "Economic Science and Political Influence," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 9263, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- A11 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Role of Economics; Role of Economists
- E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-12-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-12-15 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-HPE-2012-12-15 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2012-12-15 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-POL-2012-12-15 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOG-2012-12-15 (Sociology of Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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