IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/halshs-01491930.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Information Transmission in Hierarchies

Author

Listed:
  • Simon Schopohl

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Universität Bielefeld, UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain, EDEEM - European Doctorate in Economics Erasmus Mundus - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - Universität Bielefeld = Bielefeld University - UCL - Université Catholique de Louvain = Catholic University of Louvain - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - UvA - University of Amsterdam [Amsterdam] = Universiteit van Amsterdam - NOVA - Universidade Nova de Lisboa = NOVA University Lisbon - Université de Venise Ca’ Foscari | Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia)

Abstract

We analyze a game in which players with unique information are arranged in a hierarchy. In the lowest layer each player can decide in each of several rounds either to pass the information to his successor or to hold. While passing generates an immediate payoff according to the value of information, the player can also get an additional reward if he is the last player to pass. Facing this problem while discounting over time determines the player's behavior. Once a successor has collected all information from his workers he starts to play the same game with his successor. We state conditions for different Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria and analyse the time it takes each hierarchy to centralize the information. This allows us to compare different structures and state which structure centralizes fastest depending on the information distribution and other parameters. We show that the time the centralization takes is mostly affected by the least informed players.

Suggested Citation

  • Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Information Transmission in Hierarchies," Post-Print halshs-01491930, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01491930
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01491930
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01491930/document
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yann Bramoullé & Andrea Galeotti & Brian Rogers, 2016. "The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks," Post-Print hal-01447842, HAL.
    2. Sah, Raaj Kumar & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1986. "The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 716-727, September.
    3. Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard, 2016. "The Returns to Knowledge Hierarchies," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 32(4), pages 653-684.
    4. Yann Bramoullé & Andrea Galeotti & Brian Rogers, 2016. "The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks," Post-Print hal-03572533, HAL.
    5. Mikel Álvarez-Mozos & René van den Brink & Gerard van der Laan & Oriol Tejada, 2015. "From Hierarchies to Levels: New Solutions for Games," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 15-072/II, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Hagenbach, Jeanne, 2011. "Centralizing information in networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 149-162, May.
    7. Bramoulle, Yann & Galeotti, Andrea & Rogers, Brian (ed.), 2016. "The Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Networks," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199948277.
    8. René Brink & Frank Steffen, 2012. "Axiomatizations of a positional power score and measure for hierarchies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 757-787, June.
    9. Jan-Peter Siedlarek, 2012. "Intermediation in Networks," Working Papers 2012.42, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    10. Steven D. Levitt & Christopher M. Snyder, 1997. "Is No. News Bad News? Information Transmission and the Role of "Early Warning" in the Principal-Agent Model," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(4), pages 641-661, Winter.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Simon Schopohl, 2017. "Information Transmission in Hierarchies," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01491930, HAL.
    2. Schopohl, Simon, 2017. "Information transmission in hierarchies," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 570, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    3. Kotowski, Maciej H. & Leister, C. Matthew, 2018. "Trading Networks and Equilibrium Intermediation," Working Paper Series rwp18-001, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    4. S Anukriti & Catalina Herrera‐Almanza & Praveen K. Pathak & Mahesh Karra, 2020. "Curse of the Mummy‐ji: The Influence of Mothers‐in‐Law on Women in India†," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 102(5), pages 1328-1351, October.
    5. Yujiro Kawasaki & Kenmei Tsubota, 2019. "Myopic or farsighted: bilateral trade agreements among three symmetric countries," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 233-256, December.
    6. Francis Bloch & Bhaskar Dutta & Stéphane Robin & Min Zhu, 2016. "The formation of partnerships in social networks," Post-Print halshs-01421347, HAL.
    7. Soeiro, Renato & Adrego Pinto, Alberto, 2019. "Social power as a solution to the Bertrand Paradox," MPRA Paper 94271, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Rusinowska, Agnieszka & Taalaibekova, Akylai, 2019. "Opinion formation and targeting when persuaders have extreme and centrist opinions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 9-27.
    9. Thomas J. Sargent & John Stachurski, 2022. "Economic Networks: Theory and Computation," Papers 2203.11972, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2022.
    10. Yann Bramoullé & Habiba Djebbari & Bernard Fortin, 2020. "Peer Effects in Networks: A Survey," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 12(1), pages 603-629, August.
    11. Guido M. Kuersteiner & Ingmar R. Prucha, 2020. "Dynamic Spatial Panel Models: Networks, Common Shocks, and Sequential Exogeneity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(5), pages 2109-2146, September.
    12. Beugnot, Julie & Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2019. "Gender and peer effects on performance in social networks," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 207-224.
    13. Castagna, Alina & Chentouf, Leila & Ernst, Ekkehard, 2017. "Economic vulnerabilities in Italy: A network analysis using similarities in sectoral employment," GLO Discussion Paper Series 50, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    14. Barberis, Eduardo & Freddi, Daniela & Giammetti, Raffaele & Polidori, Paolo & Teobaldelli, Désirée & Viganò, Elena, 2020. "Trade Relationships in the European Pork Value Chain: A Network Analysis," Economia agro-alimentare / Food Economy, Italian Society of Agri-food Economics/Società Italiana di Economia Agro-Alimentare (SIEA), vol. 22(1), May.
    15. Charalambos Vlados & Fotios Katimertzopoulos, 2019. "The ¡°Mystery¡± of Innovation: Bridging the Economic and Business Thinking and the Stra.Tech.Man Approach," Business and Economic Research, Macrothink Institute, vol. 9(1), pages 236-262, March.
    16. Germano, Fabrizio & Sobbrio, Francesco, 2020. "Opinion dynamics via search engines (and other algorithmic gatekeepers)," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 187(C).
    17. Robert J. Shiller, 2017. "Narrative Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(4), pages 967-1004, April.
    18. Jadbabaie, Ali & Kakhbod, Ali, 2019. "Optimal contracting in networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 1094-1153.
    19. Halleck-Vega, Solmaria & Mandel, Antoine & Millock, Katrin, 2018. "Accelerating diffusion of climate-friendly technologies: A network perspective," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 235-245.
    20. Boosey, Luke & Mark Isaac, R., 2016. "Asymmetric network monitoring and punishment in public goods experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 132(PA), pages 26-41.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    communication network; dynamic network game; hierarchical structure; information transmission;
    All these keywords.

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01491930. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: CCSD (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.