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La motivation intrinsèque des salariés des organismes agréés des services à la personne

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  • Salah Ould Younes

    (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper aims to test the intrinsic motivation of licensed in-home services (LIHS) employees with an emphasis on the differences in hourly wages paid to the employees of non-profit LIHS and for-profit LIHS employees. Our approach is to test intrinsic motivation by using the "labor donation" theory of Preston (1989), depending on whether the LIHS organization is for-profit or non-profit. This theory states that employees in non-profit sectors place lower value on money and higher value on non-monetary benefits such as social responsibility. The analysis is based upon French data: DADS (official wage data) from Insee, the French National Institute of Statistics ; Dares French Labor Study data ; and Nova data from ANSP, the national agency for development of in-home services. We estimate an Endogenous Switching Model with two methods. First, we adopt the two-step Heckman approach with extended correction terms. Second, we estimate the model with the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) method where we include instrumental variables for identification purposes.

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  • Salah Ould Younes, 2014. "La motivation intrinsèque des salariés des organismes agréés des services à la personne," Post-Print halshs-01025110, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01025110
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://shs.hal.science/halshs-01025110
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    6. Mathieu Narcy, 2009. "Les salariés du secteur associatif sont-ils davantage intrinsèquement motivés que ceux du secteur privé ?," Economie & Prévision, La Documentation Française, vol. 0(2), pages 81-99.
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