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What are you calling intuitive? Subject heterogeneity as a driver of response times in an impunity game

Author

Listed:
  • Werner Güth

    (LUISS - Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli [Roma], Max-Planck-Institute for Research on Collective Goods)

  • Paolo Crosetto

    (GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée de Grenoble - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes - Grenoble INP - Institut polytechnique de Grenoble - Grenoble Institute of Technology - UGA - Université Grenoble Alpes)

Abstract

Studies on the intuitive or deliberate nature of human actions often use time constraints for identification, assuming that constrained individuals fall back to intuitive behavior. This identification strategy disregards individual heterogeneity and self-priming, i.e. the behavioral rule that subjects can form during the instructions phase, and then apply irrespective of the time constraint. We use respondent data from an impunity game as an example of how subject heterogeneity can drive results. 24 respondents face 240 more or less unfair allocation proposals out of a small or large pie and can accept or reject the offer. Upon rejection respondents burn their own money, but not the proposer's. Respondents decisions are communicated to the proposer. On average, emotional rejections take longer than deliberate acceptances. Including individual heterogeneity, though, we find that subjects who mostly accept (reject) take more time to reject (accept). Faster decisions are the ones conforming with the modal early reaction. We attribute this finding to heterogeneity in self-priming. Since self-priming is orthogonal to time constraints, it has the capacity to invalidate their use in the identification of dual decision modes.

Suggested Citation

  • Werner Güth & Paolo Crosetto, 2021. "What are you calling intuitive? Subject heterogeneity as a driver of response times in an impunity game," Post-Print hal-03722234, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03722234
    DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2021.102419
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social Heuristic Hypothesis; Response time; Dual decision theories; Impunity game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D87 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Neuroeconomics

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