Trust and financial trades : lessons from an investment game wher reciprocators can hide behind probabilities
AbstractThis paper shows that if a very small, exogenously given probability of terminating the exchange is introduced in an elementary investment game, more reciprocators will choose the defection strategy. Everything happens as if they "hide behind probabilities" in order to break the trust relationship. Investors do not alter their behavior in a significant way, at least not for a very small external risk. Financial assets all come with a predetermined and contractual probability that by the time when the buyer has to receive the reward for his investment, "bad luck" might have brought the asset value down to zero. In the light of the experimental findings, such trades would not provide a favorable environment for building trust.
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Date of creation: 01 Oct 2011
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Trust ; Financial transactions ; Experimental economics ; Investment game ; External randomness;
Other versions of this item:
- Vranceanu, Radu & Sutan, Angela & Dubart, Delphine, 2010. "Trust and Financial Trades: Lessons from an Investment Game Where Reciprocators Can Hide Behind Probabilities," ESSEC Working Papers DR 10007, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- G00 - Financial Economics - - General - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-12 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-03-12 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-03-12 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2011-03-12 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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