Preferences for redistribution : an empirical analysis
AbstractPeople's preferences for state intervention in social policies vary. A cross-section analysis on individual-level survey data is conducted here to highlight the link between the economic position of agents and their specific demand for redistribution. Controlling for a number of factors usually found to affect individual preferences in the literature, the egoistic motives for redistribution are taken seriously and this article focuses on the role played by the occupational status of individuals in shaping their preferences. Thus, the relative importance of economic factors in terms of current and expected gains is estimated, taking into account individuals' experience of social mobility and risk aversion. Furthermore, the research presented here identifies which socio-political groups may be formed on the basis of their preferences for redistribution.
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Date of creation: Apr 2011
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Redistribution; occupation; social mobility; ordered logit regression.;
Other versions of this item:
- Elvire Guillaud, 2011. "Preferences for redistribution: an empirical analysis," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 11030, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- D31 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - Personal Income and Wealth Distribution
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
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