Property rights and earnings manipulations
AbstractThis paper analyzes the links between cash flow rights, control rights and property rights in situations where a firm's security holders can manipulate earnings (intertemporal substitution). It is shown that the allocation of these rights a¤ects the incentives of claimholders when intertemporal substitution activities are numerous and cannot be contracted ex-ante. The main results we obtain are: 1) current cash flow rights and residual property rights are connected through the rule of marginal revenues; 2) the allocation of control rights does not necessarily coincide with the allocation of residual property rights; 3) when current cash flow rights are two-part linear, and in some cases when they are three-part linear, the problem of earnings manipulation can be eliminated through the appropriate design of property rights. However, for some contracts earnings manipulation is unavoidable. This theory provides new insights into the link between different rights of the holders of securities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance in its series Working Papers with number 0612.
Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
earnings manipulations; intertemporal substitution; design of securities; property rights; cash flow rights.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-04-09 (All new papers)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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