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Optimal Financial Instruments

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  • Zender, Jaime F
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    Abstract

    Debt and equity are developed as optimal financial instruments in a model where cash flows and control rights are allocated to investors endogenously. When investment decisions must be made by a single party, the debtholder's cash flows are fixed in order to provide the equityholder with efficient incentives for investment. Ownership of control may be transferred to the debtholder to attenuate the impact of asymmetric information, concerning the investment opportunity, on the efficiency of the decision-making. Copyright 1991 by American Finance Association.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by American Finance Association in its journal Journal of Finance.

    Volume (Year): 46 (1991)
    Issue (Month): 5 (December)
    Pages: 1645-63

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    Handle: RePEc:bla:jfinan:v:46:y:1991:i:5:p:1645-63

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    Cited by:
    1. Berlin, Mitchell & Mester, Loretta J., 2001. "Lender Liability and Large Investors," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 108-137, April.
    2. Anderson, Ronald W & Nyborg, Kjell G, 2001. "Financing and Corporate Growth under Repeated Moral Hazard," CEPR Discussion Papers 2920, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Fulghieri, Paolo & Lukin, Dmitry, 2001. "Information production, dilution costs, and optimal security design," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 3-42, July.
    4. Neumann, Rebecca M., 2006. "The effects of capital controls on international capital flows in the presence of asymmetric information," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 1010-1027, October.
    5. Tashjian, Elizabeth & Lease, Ronald C. & McConnell, John J., 1996. "An empirical analysis of prepackaged bankruptcies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 135-162, January.
    6. Rebecca Neumann, 2003. "International capital flows under asymmetric information and costly monitoring: implications of debt and equity financing," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 36(3), pages 674-700, August.
    7. Cantale, Salvatore & Russino, Annalisa, 2004. "Putable common stock," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(5), pages 753-775, November.
    8. Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 2000. "Optimal Financial Contracts for Large Investors: The Role of Lender Liability," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 99-33, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
    9. Choe, Chongwoo, 2003. "Leverage, volatility and executive stock options," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(5), pages 591-609, November.
    10. Tan, Liang, 2013. "Creditor control rights, state of nature verification, and financial reporting conservatism," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-22.
    11. Osano, Hiroshi, 1997. "An Evolutionary Model of Corporate Governance and Employment Contracts," Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 403-436, September.
    12. Bruno Cassiman, 1996. "Influence activity and the organization of research and development," Economics Working Papers 264, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1997.
    13. Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 1999. "Financial contracts and the legal treatment of informed investors," Working Papers 99-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    14. João Pinto & Mário Coutinho dos Santos, 2014. "Corporate Financing Choices after the 2007-2008 Financial Crisis," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 03, Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto).
    15. Kalay, Avner & Zender, Jaime F., 1997. "Bankruptcy, Warrants, and State-Contingent Changes in the Ownership of Control," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 347-379, October.
    16. Anton Miglo, 2006. "Property rights and earnings manipulations," Working Papers 0612, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
    17. Casson, Peter D. & Martin, Roderick & Nisar, Tahir M., 2008. "The financing decisions of innovative firms," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 208-221, June.
    18. Maug, Ernst, 1997. "Boards of directors and capital structure: Alternative forms of corporate restructuring," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 113-139, April.
    19. Banerji, Sanjay & Errunza, Vihang R., 2005. "Privatization under incomplete information and bankruptcy risk," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 735-757, March.
    20. Elías Albagli, 2003. "El Embriague Financiero: Una Visión Alternativa de Amplificación Bancaria," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 207, Central Bank of Chile.

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