This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Can earnings manipulation create value?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Anton Miglo () (University of Guelph, Department of Economics)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Existing literature usually considers earnings manipulation to be a negative social phenomenon. We argue that earnings manipulation can be a part of the equilibrium relationships between firm's ’insiders and outsiders. We consider an optimal contract between an entrepreneur and an investor where the entrepreneur is subject to a double moral hazard problem (one being the choice of production effort and the other being intertemporal substitution, which consists of transferring cash flows between periods). Investment and production effort may be below socially optimal levels because the entrepreneur cannot entirely capture the results of his effort. The opportunity to manipulate earnings protects the entrepreneur against the risk of a low payoff when the results of production are low. Ex-ante, this provides an incentive for the entrepreneur to increase his level of effort and invest efficiently.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.economics.uoguelph.ca/Research/DisPapers/2008_3.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Guelph, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0803.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:gue:guelph:2008-3

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Guelph, Ontario, N1G 2W1
Phone: (519) 824-4120 ext. 53898
Fax: (519) 763-8497
Web page: http://www.economics.uoguelph.ca/index.htm
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Dianqin Wang).

Related research
Keywords: Earnings manipulation; intertemporal substitution; design of securities; property rights; moral hazard.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
D92 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Michael C. Jensen, 2003. "Paying People to Lie: the Truth about the Budgeting Process," European Financial Management, Blackwell Publishing Ltd, vol. 9(3), pages 379-406. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Titman, Sheridan & Wessels, Roberto, 1988. " The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(1), pages 1-19, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Francesca Cornelli & Oved Yosha, 2003. "Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(1), pages 1-32, January.
  4. Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, 2003. "Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(2), pages 281-315, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1994. "What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data," NBER Working Papers 4875, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Degeorge, Francois & Patel, Jayendu & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1999. "Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 72(1), pages 1-33, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Burgstahler, David & Dichev, Ilia, 1997. "Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 99-126, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Roychowdhury, Sugata, 2006. "Earnings management through real activities manipulation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 335-370, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? No RePEc service, like IDEAS, charges for the use or the display of bibliographic data.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-17.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.