Defined Contribution vs Defined Pension: Reforming the Legal Retirement Age
AbstractIn this paper we analyze the effects of changing Social Security parameters on the optimal legal retirement age. Two Social Security Systems are studied, with opposite results. When the pension scheme has a defined contribution, a more redistributive system will delay the preferred legal retirement age. On the other hand, when the pension benefit is the defined parameter, the increase in the redistribution level will lower this preferred age.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. in its series ThE Papers with number 08/13.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 22 Dec 2008
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGE-2009-02-22 (Economics of Ageing)
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-22 (All new papers)
- NEP-LAB-2009-02-22 (Labour Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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