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Postponing the Legal Retirement Age

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Author Info
Juan Antonio Lacomba () (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada)
Francisco Miguel Lagos (Department of Economic Theory and Economic History, University of Granada)

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the reform of the pensionable age as an answer to the future financing problems of public pension systems. We use a two-staged model where, firstly, the government decides the redistribution level of the pension system, and, secondly, individuals face a voting process on the legal retirement age. Our results suggest that an increase in the redistributive character of the system could lead to a larger social consensus to postpone the legal retirement age. Surprisingly, it could be the case that the richest people would support more redistribution if that implies to postpone the pensionable age.

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File URL: http://www.ugr.es/~teoriahe/RePEc/gra/wpaper/thepapers05_13.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada. in its series ThE Papers with number 05/13.

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Length: 25 pages
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:gra:wpaper:05/13

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Related research
Keywords: Legal retirement age; pension benefits; redistribution level;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kahn, James A., 1988. "Social security, liquidity, and early retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 97-117, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Andrew A. Samwick, 1998. "New Evidence on Pensions, Social Security, and the Timing of Retirement," NBER Working Papers 6534, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2000. "The Political Economy of Social Security," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. CREMER, Helmuth & PESTIEAU, Pierre, 2002. "The Double Dividend of Postponing Retirement," IDEI Working Papers 144, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2003. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Crawford, Vincent P & Lilien, David M, 1981. "Social Security and the Retirement Decision," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 96(3), pages 505-29, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Conde-Ruiz, J. Ignacio & Galasso, Vincenzo, 2004. "The macroeconomics of early retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(9-10), pages 1849-1869, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Casamatta, Georges & Cremer, Helmuth & Pestieau, Pierre, 2003. "Voting on Pensions with Endogenous Retirement Age," CEPR Discussion Papers 3778, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Sveinbjörn Blöndal & Stefano Scarpetta, 1999. "The Retirement Decision in OECD Countries," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 202, OECD, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
  9. Monika Bütler, 2002. "The Political Feasibility of Increasing the Retirement Age: Lessons from a Ballot on the Female Retirement Age," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 349-365, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Sheshinski, Eytan, 1978. "A model of social security and retirement decisions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 337-360, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Galasso, Vincenzo & Profeta, Paola, 2002. "The political economy of social security: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 1-29, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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