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Public Disclosure of Patent Applications, R&D, and Welfare

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Author Info
Aoki, R.
Spiegel, Y.

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Abstract

In Europe and in Japan, patent applications are publicly disclosed after 18 months from the filing date regardless of whether a patent has been or will be registered. In the U.S. in contrast, patent applications are publicly disclosed only when a patent is granted. In this paper we examine the consequences of this difference for (i) firm's R&D and patenting behavior, (ii) consumers' surplus and social welfare, and (iii) the incentives of firms to innovate in a setting where patent protection is imperfect in the sense that patent applications may be rejected and patents are not always upheld in court. The main conclusions are that public disclosure leads to fewer patent applications and fewer innovations, but for a given number of innovations, it raises the probability that new technologies will reach the product market and thereby enhances consumers' surplus and possibly total welfare as well.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tel Aviv in its series Papers with number 30-98.

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Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 1998
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:teavfo:30-98

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Related research
Keywords: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ; PATENTS ; CONSUMPTION;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Intellectual Property Rights
O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Hylton, Keith N, 1993. "Asymmetric Information and the Selection of Disputes for Litigation," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 187-210, January.
  2. Suzanne Scotchmer & Jerry Green, 1990. "Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 131-146, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Michael J. Meurer, 1989. "The Settlement of Patent Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(1), pages 77-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, 1995. "On the Division of Profit in Sequential Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 20-33, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Mansfield, Edwin & Schwartz, Mark & Wagner, Samuel, 1981. "Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 91(364), pages 907-18, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Reiko Aoki & Jin-Li Hu, 1999. "Licensing vs. Litigation: The Effect of the Legal System on Incentives to Innovate," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 8(1), pages 133-160, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Richard C. Levin & Alvin K. Klevorick & Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, 1987. "Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 18(1987-3), pages 783-832. [Downloadable!]
  8. Thomas J. Prusa & Reiko Aoki, 1996. "Product Development and the Timing of Information Disclosure under U.S. and Japanese Patent Systems," Departmental Working Papers 199423, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  9. Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, 1990. "Optimal Patent Length and Breadth," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 106-112, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Merges, Robert P. & Nelson, Richard R., 1994. "On limiting or encouraging rivalry in technical progress: The effect of patent scope decisions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 1-24, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Arundel, Anthony & Kabla, Isabelle, 1998. "What percentage of innovations are patented? empirical estimates for European firms," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 127-141, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Richard C. Levin & Alvin K. Klevorick & Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, 1988. "Appropriating the Returns from Industrial R&D," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 862, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  13. Ted O'Donoghue & Suzanne Scotchmer & Jacques-François Thisse, 1998. "Patent Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 7(1), pages 1-32, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Klemperer, Paul, 1990. "How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?," CEPR Discussion Papers 392, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Mukesh Eswaran & Nancy Gallini, 1996. "Patent Policy and the Direction of Technological Change," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(4), pages 722-746, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Nancy T. Gallini, 1992. "Patent Policy and Costly Imitation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(1), pages 52-63, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Ordover, Janusz A, 1991. "A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 43-60, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Howard F. Chang, 1995. "Patent Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(1), pages 34-57, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Carmen Matutes & Pierre Regibeau & Katharine Rockett, 1996. "Optimal Patent Design and the Diffusion of Innovations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(1), pages 60-83, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Ted O'Donoghue, 1998. "A Patentability Requirement for Sequential Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(4), pages 654-679, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Crampes, C. & Langinier, C., 1996. "Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents," Papers 96.429, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
    Other versions:
  22. Waterson, Michael, 1990. "The Economics of Product Patents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 860-69, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Horstmann, Ignatius & MacDonald, Glenn M & Slivinski, Alan, 1985. "Patents as Information Transfer Mechanisms: To Patent or (Maybe) Not to Patent," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 837-58, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Choi, Jay Pil, 1998. "Patent Litigation as an Information-Transmission Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1249-63, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Suzanne Scotchmer, 1996. "Protecting Early Innovators: Should Second-Generation Products Be Patentable?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(2), pages 322-331, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. repec:att:wimass:1920030 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Reiko Aoki & Tomoko Saiki, 2005. "Implications of Product Patents : Lessons from Japan," Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series d05-85, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
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