Information Disclosure in the Renewal of Patents
AbstractThis paper presents a patent choice model allowing strategic decisions in a sequential game with two agents: a patentholder, who perfectly knows thecharasteristics of the market, and a potential entrant who has no information about the value of demand. We study several Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. We show that there exists no separating equilibrium because the incumbent of a high-valued market always has some incentive to mimic the behavior of a firm in a bad market. Consequently, we find equilibria where the incumbent prefers not to pay the renewal fee for the patent hoping that it will be interpreted by the challenger as a signal of low market profitability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number 96.429.
Length: 23 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
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INFORMATION ; MONOPOLIES;
Other versions of this item:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- O34 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property Rights
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- Marc Baudry & Béatrice Dumont, 2009. "A Bayesian Real Option Approach to Patents and Optimal Renewal Fees," Working Papers hal-00419330, HAL.
- McAleer, Michael & Chan, Felix & Marinova, Dora, 2007. "An econometric analysis of asymmetric volatility: Theory and application to patents," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 139(2), pages 259-284, August.
- Felix Chan & Dora Marinova & Michael McAleer, 2004. "Trends and volatilities in foreign patents registered in the USA," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 36(6), pages 585-592.
- Langinier, Corinne, 2005.
"Using Patents to Mislead Rivals,"
Staff General Research Papers
11483, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Jinyoung Kim, 2010. "Patent Portfolio Management of Sequential Innovations," Discussion Paper Series 1005, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
- Aoki, R. & Spiegel, Y., 1998.
"Public Disclosure of Patent Applications, R&D, and Welfare,"
30-98, Tel Aviv.
- Reiko Aoki & Yossef Spiegel, 2000. "Public Disclosure of Patent Applications, R & D, and Welfare," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1273, Econometric Society.
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