Patent Policy and the Direction of Technological Change
AbstractIn this article we examine the interaction between firms' product and process innovation decisions, and the role patent policy can play in directing technological change toward a socially efficient mix of innovations. Product innovation is a variant on a pioneer's new product; process innovation improves upon the cost efficiency of production. In a model with heterogeneous consumers, we show that an entrant relaxes competition by trading off too much process innovation in favor of product innovation, relative to what the social planner would desire. This bias toward product innovation can be corrected through appropriate choice of patent breadths on product and process innovations.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 27 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Nancy Gallini, 2011.
"Private agreements for coordinating patent rights: the case of patent pools,"
ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE,
FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2011(3), pages 5-30.
- Gallini, Nancy, 2010. "Private Agreements for Coordinating Patent Rights: The Case of Patent Pools," Economics working papers nancy_gallini-2010-34, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 17 Nov 2010.
- Gallini, Nancy, 2011. "Private Agreements for Coordinating Patent Rights: The Case of Patent Pools," IEL Working Papers 5, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
- Gallini, Nancy & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2001.
"Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt9wx2c2hz, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2002. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 2, pages 51-78 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2002. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," Law and Economics 0201001, EconWPA.
- Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, 2003. "Intellectual Property: When is it the Best Incentive System?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000532, David K. Levine.
- Nancy Gallini and Suzanne Scotchmer., 2001. "Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best Incentive System?," Economics Working Papers E01-303, University of California at Berkeley.
- Pierre Regibeau & Katharine Rockett, 2004. "The Relationship Between Intellectual Property Law and Competition Law: An Economic Approach," Economics Discussion Papers 581, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Swati Dhingra, 2011. "Trading Away Wide Brands for Cheap Brands," CEP Discussion Papers dp1103, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Keely,L.C., 2000. "Using patents in growth models," Working papers 30, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.