Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy
AbstractThe restructing of a bankrupt company often entails a change of control. By efficiency of a bankruptcy procedure it is usually meant that the control is allocated into the hands of those who can maximise its value. In this paper we focus instead on how to allocate control with a procedure that allows creditors to maximise their returns. The conclusion is that creditors should be allowed to retain a fraction of the shares of the company.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research in its series Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers with number 18-98.
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Other versions of this item:
- Cornelli, Francesca & Felli, Leonardo, 1998. "Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2030, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Leonardo Felli & Francesca Cornelli, 1998. "Revenue Efficiency and Change of Control: The Case of Bankruptcy," FMG Discussion Papers dp300, Financial Markets Group.
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
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- Renée Birgit Adams & Francesca Cornelli & Leonardo Felli, 2012.
"How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company,"
International Review of Finance,
International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 12(2), pages 197-226, 06.
- Ernst-Ludwig VON THADDEN & Erik BERGLÖF & Gérard ROLAND, 2003. "Optimal Debt Design and the Role of Bankruptcy," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 03.13, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 2000.
"Optimal Financial Contracts for Large Investors: The Role of Lender Liability,"
Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers
99-33, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 2000. "Optimal financial contracts for large investors: the role of lender liability," Working Papers 00-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
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