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Bargaining and the Division of Value in Corporate Reorganization

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Author Info
Lucian Arye Bebchuk
Howard F. Chang

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Abstract

This paper develops a sequential bargaining model of the negotiations in corporate reorganizations under Chapter 11. We identify the expected outcome of the bargaining process and examine the effects of the legal rules that shape the bargaining. We determine how much value equity holders and debt holders receive under the Chapter 11 process, and compare the value obtained by each class with the 'contractual right' of that class. We identify and analyze three reasons that the equity holders can expect to obtain some value even when the debt holders are not paid in full. Finally, we show how the features of the reorganization process and of the company filing under Chapter 11 affect the division of value, and in this way we provide several testable predictions.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Technical Working Papers with number 0097.

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Date of creation: Feb 1991
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberte:0097

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1990. "A Theory of Corporate Financial Structure Based on the Seniority of Claims," NBER Working Papers 3431, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Charles P. Normandin, 1989. "The changing nature of debt and equity; a legal perspective," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, pages 49-79. [Downloadable!]
  3. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Sanford J. Grossman & Motty Perry, 1986. "Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information," NBER Technical Working Papers 0056, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Hart, O. & Moore, J., 1989. "Default And Renegotiation: A Dynamic Model Of Debt," Working papers 520, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
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  6. White, Michelle J, 1989. "The Corporate Bankruptcy Decision," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 129-51, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. David M. Cutler & Lawrence H. Summers, 1988. "The Costs of Conflict Resolution and Financial Distress: Evidence from the Texaco-Pennzoil Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(2), pages 157-172, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Gul, Faruk & Sonnenschein, Hugo, 1988. "On Delay in Bargaining with One-Sided Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(3), pages 601-11, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Myers, Stewart C., 1977. "Determinants of corporate borrowing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 147-175, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Alessandro Penati & Luigi Zingales, 1997. "Efficiency and Distribution in Financial Restructuring: The Case of the Ferruzzi Group," CRSP working papers 466, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  2. Dan Galai & Alon Raviv & Zvi Wiener, 2003. "Liquidation Triggers and the Valuation of Equity and Debt," Finance 0305002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. V. M. González-Méndez & Francisco González-Rodríguez, 2000. "Procedimientos de resolución de insolvencia financiera en España: costes de insolvencia y transferencia de riqueza," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 24(2), pages 357-384, May. [Downloadable!]
  4. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1998. "Chapter 11," NBER Working Papers 6473, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Jocelyn Martel, 1996. "Solutions au stress financier : Un survol de la littérature," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-03, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  6. Benjamin, David, . "Fast Bargaining in Bankruptcy," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0601, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. repec:bep:dewple:2001-1-1025 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Stanley D. Longhofer & Stephen R. Peters, 2000. "Protection for whom? creditor conflicts in bankruptcy," Working Paper 9909R, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
  9. Bruno Funchal & Aloisio Araujo, 2007. "A Nova Lei De Falências Brasileira: Primeiros Impactos," Anais do XXXV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 35th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 079, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics]. [Downloadable!]
  10. Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de & Funchal, Bruno, 2005. "Past and Future of the Bankruptcy Law in Brazil and Latin America," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 599, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  11. Timothy C. G. Fisher & Jocelyn Martel, 1994. "The Creditors' Financial Reorganization Decision: New Evidence from Canadian Data," CIRANO Working Papers 94s-21, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Urs W. Birchler & Dominik Egli, 2003. "Ein neues Bankinsolvenzrecht für die Schweiz," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 139(II), pages 125-154, June. [Downloadable!]
  13. Paul G. Mahoney, 1998. "Trust and Opportunism in Close Corporations," NBER Working Papers 6819, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, 2001. "Ex Ante Costs of Violating Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy," CEPR Discussion Papers 2914, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  15. Dong-Kyoon Kim & Chuck Kwok, 2009. "The influence of managerial incentives on the resolution of financial distress," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 61-83, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Jocelyn Martel, 1995. "Signaling in Financial Reorganization: Theory and Evidence from Canada," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-34, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  17. Brunner, Antje & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2004. "Multiple Lenders and Corporate Distress: Evidence on Debt Restructuring," CEPR Discussion Papers 4287, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Stanley D. Longhofer, 1997. "Absolute priority rule violations, credit rationing, and efficiency," Working Paper 9710, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. [Downloadable!]
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