Inflation-Conservatism and Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions
AbstractThis paper investigates the stabilization bias that arises in a model of monetary and fiscal policy stabilization of the economy, when assuming that the monetary authority put higher weight on inflation stabilization than society. We demonstrate that inflation-conservatism unambiguously leads to social welfare losses if the fiscal authority acts strategically. Although the precise form of monetary-fiscal interactions depends on the choice of fiscal instrument and on the level of steady state debt, the assessment of gains is robust to these assumptions. We also study how the outcome of stabilization depends on the leadership structure. We develop an algorithm that computes leadership equilibria as well in much wider spectrum of problems with strategic agents
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Exeter University, Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 0801.
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
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Monetary and Fiscal Policy; Policy Delegation; Discretion; Leadership Equilibria;
Other versions of this item:
- Andrew P. Blake & Tatiana Kirsanova, 2011. "Inflation Conservatism and Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 7(2), pages 41-83, June.
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
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