Strategic Aspects of Hegemony

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Strategic Aspects of Hegemony

Author Info

Robert E. Goodin
Werner Güth ()
Duncan Snidal

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Werner Güth

Abstract

Hegemony is a central feature of contemporary international politics but it remains seriously under-theorized. We draw on cooperative game theory to represent and analyze different aspects of hegemony. After developing a general conception of hegemony, we analyze the circumstances under which a Hegemon needs assistance from allies, examine when prospective allies have incentives to cooperate with or challenge Hegemon and evaluate the prospects for exploitation by Hegemon. Throughout, we connect the analytic analysis to the existing theories of international hegemony and illustrate the models with real world examples.

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Paper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group in its series Papers on Strategic Interaction with number 2005-29.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2005-29

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2006-01-01 (All new papers)
NEP-CSE-2006-01-01 (Economics of Strategic Management)
NEP-KNM-2006-01-01 (Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy)

References listed on IDEAS
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John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, January.
Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Snidal, Duncan, 1985. "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory," International Organization, MIT Press, vol. 39(4), pages 579-614, Autumn.
Grieco, Joseph M., 1988. "Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: a realist critique of the newest liberal institutionalism," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(03), pages 485-507, June. [Downloadable!]
Snidal, Duncan, 1985. "The limits of hegemonic stability theory," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 39(04), pages 579-614, September. [Downloadable!]

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