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Favoritism of agents – The case of referees’ home bias

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Author Info
Matthias Sutter
Martin G. Kocher

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Abstract

We study the behavior of football (soccer) referees in the German Bundesliga. Referees are requested to act as impartial agents. However, they may be tempted to allocate benefits and rewards in a biased way. Agency theory has long neglected this form of malfeasance of economic agents, but has rather concentrated on agents exerting suboptimal effort levels. Favoritism or biased behavior of referees can be investigated by examining their decisions on awarding penalties or extra time at the end of a football match. We can confirm a systematic home bias of referees.

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Paper provided by Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group in its series Papers on Strategic Interaction with number 2002-28.

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Length: 29 pages
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Handle: RePEc:esi:discus:2002-28

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Keywords: agency theory; favoritism; social pressure; referee; German Bundesliga;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior
D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Luis Garicano & Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Canice Prendergast, 2001. "Favoritism Under Social Pressure," Working Papers 2001-16, Brown University, Department of Economics.
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  2. John Knowles & Nicola Persico & Petra Todd, 2001. "Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(1), pages 203-232, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Prendergast, Canice & Topel, Robert H, 1996. "Favoritism in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 958-78, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-77, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Roberto Antonietti, 2008. "Il ruolo economico dell’arbitro di calcio: una rassegna della letteratura e alcune questioni aperte," Rivista di Diritto ed Economia dello Sport, Centro di diritto e business dello Sport, vol. 4(3), pages 75-103, Dicembre. [Downloadable!]
  2. Martin G. Kocher & Matthias Sutter, 2004. "Time is money - Time pressure, incentives, and the quality of decision-making," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2004-05, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Per Pettersson-Lidbom & Mikael Priks, 2007. "Behavior under Social Pressure: Empty Italian Stadiums and Referee Bias," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  4. Rickman, Neil & Witt, Robert, 2005. "Favouritism and Financial Incentives: A Natural Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 4968, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Babatunde Buraimo & David Forrest & Robert Simmons, 2007. "The Twelfth Man? Refereeing Bias in English and German Soccer," Working Papers 0707, International Association of Sports Economists. [Downloadable!]
  6. Scoppa, Vincenzo, 2008. "Are Subjective Evaluations Biased by Social Factors or Connections? An Econometric Analysis of Soccer Referee Decisions," MPRA Paper 15819, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. Peter Dawson & Stephen Dobson, 2008. "The Influence of Social Pressure and Nationality on Individual Decisions: Evidence from the Behaviour of Referees," Working Papers 0809, International Association of Sports Economists. [Downloadable!]
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