Dropping the Ax: Illegal Firings During Union Election Campaigns, 1951-2007
AbstractThis report updates an earlier report from January of 2007, which found a steep rise in illegal firings of pro-union workers in the 2000s relative to the last half of the 1990s. It updates the index of the probability that a pro-union worker will be fired in the course of a union election campaign, using published data from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). It also takes into consideration the increase in card-check organizing campaigns that began in the mid-1990s and adjusts the index for this factor. By 2007, pro-union workers involved in union election campaigns faced about a 1.8 percent chance of being illegally fired during the course of the campaign. If we assume that employers target union organizers and activists, and that union organizers and activists make up about 10 percent of pro-union workers, our estimates suggest that almost one-in-five union organizers or activists can expect to be fired as a result of their activities in a union election campaign. Since 2000, illegal firings have marred over one-in-four NLRB-sponsored union elections, reaching 30 percent of elections in 2007.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) in its series CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs with number 2009-12.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2009
Date of revision:
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illegal firings; unions; NLRB; EFCA; organizing campaigns;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J - Labor and Demographic Economics
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- J5 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining
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- J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
- J58 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Public Policy
- J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies
- J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
- J7 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination
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- J83 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Workers' Rights
- J88 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Standards - - - Public Policy
- K - Law and Economics
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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- John Schmitt & Alexandra Mitukiewicz, 2011.
"Politics Matter: Changes in Unionization Rates in Rich Countries, 1960-2010,"
CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs
2011-24, Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR).
- John Schmitt & Alexandra Mitukiewicz, 2012. "Politics matter: changes in unionisation rates in rich countries, 1960–2010," Industrial Relations Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(3), pages 260-280, 05.
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