Inclusive and Exclusive Social Preferences: A Deweyan Framework to Explain Governance Heterogeneity
AbstractWe suggest that Dewey's theory of value formation has implications for the contraposition between individual and social preferences in economics. We re-consider that distinction and introduce, instead, the notions of inclusive and exclusive social preferences. We then apply this distinction to governance forms and suggest an explanatory framework of governance heterogeneity which contrasts exclusive and inclusive governance structures. In the final discussion we illustrate a possible use of the framework for assessing cooperatives and social enterprises as well as traditional corporations. More generally, we argue that the assessment of governance heterogeneity would benefit from a consideration of the type of social preferences underlying formal as well as substantive involvement of publics.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Econometica in its series Econometica Working Papers with number wp36.
Date of creation: Apr 2012
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private-public dichotomy; social preferences; pragmatism; governance heterogeneity; stakeholders;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B00 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - General - - - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
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- Ostrom, Elinor, 2010. "Revising theory in light of experimental findings," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 68-72, January.
- Kenneth L. Avio, 2002. "Three problems of social organisation: institutional law and economics meets Habermasian law and democracy," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(4), pages 501-520, July.
- Keith Cowling & Philip R. Tomlinson, 2011. "Post the 'Washington Consensus': economic governance and industrial strategies for the twenty-first century," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 35(5), pages 831-852.
- Sacchetti, Silvia & Tortia, Ermanno, 2012. "The internal and external governance of cooperatives: the effective membership and consistency of value," AICCON Working Papers 111-2012, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit.
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