Corporate Venture Capital: The Upside of Failure and Competition for Talent
AbstractWe consider the motives for a firm to engage in corporate venturing. We argue that in case of failure of a new venture, corporate venture capitalists (CVC) have a strategic advantage relative to traditional venture capitalists (VC) in creating rents after rehiring or refinancing the entrepreneurs. Hence, corporate venturing induces the would-be entrepreneur to exert an effort that is higher than within the corporation, but lower than under traditional venture capital financing. Ceteris paribus, the entrepreneur ends up with fewer shares and less control under CVC financing than under traditional VC financing. Competition from venture capitalists increases corporate venturing activity, the salaries of potential entrepreneurs, and total economic output. Our results are consistent with the observed pro-cyclicality of corporate venture capital activity with venture capital activity.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2003-45.
Date of creation: 2003
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Other versions of this item:
- Chemla, Gilles & de Bettignies, Jean-Etienne, 2003. "Corporate Venture Capital: The Upside of Failure and Competition for Talent," CEPR Discussion Papers 4139, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- De bettignies, Jean-Etienne & Chemla, Gilles, 2003. "Corporate Venture Capital: The Upside of Failure and Competition for Talent," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/6366, Paris Dauphine University.
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
- M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups
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