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Taking lemons for a trial run: does type of job exit affect the risk of entering fixed-term employment in Germany?

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  • Biegert, Thomas
  • Kühhirt, Michael

Abstract

A central argument for the deregulation of employment contracts is that fixed-term contracts boost employment of jobseekers with uncertain productivity by giving employers a tool to screen such applicants over a longer period of time before permanent hire. We test this proposition by comparing the risk of entering fixed-term employment for individually laid-off workers with that for individuals who have left their previous job for other reasons. This strategy is based on the assumption that in the German context individual lay-offs create uncertainty about jobseekers’ productivity. We use data on work exits and subsequent labour market re-entry of the prime-age workforce in Germany from waves 2000–2013 of the Socio-Economic Panel. Our results show that the risk of fixed-term employment is substantively smaller after voluntary job exits but reveal only a small and statistically insignificant risk difference between individual lay-offs and workplace closures after adjusting for differences in socio-economic background and characteristics of the previous job. These findings challenge the view that employers use fixed-term contracts as an instrument to screen specific groups of workers whose productivity is highly uncertain, at least with regard to recent career disruptions.

Suggested Citation

  • Biegert, Thomas & Kühhirt, Michael, 2018. "Taking lemons for a trial run: does type of job exit affect the risk of entering fixed-term employment in Germany?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 87334, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  • Handle: RePEc:ehl:lserod:87334
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    File URL: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/87334/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Pollio, Chiara & Landini, Fabio & Prodi, Elena & Arrighetti, Alessandro, 2023. "Does Temporary Employment undermine the Quality of Permanent Jobs?," GLO Discussion Paper Series 1273, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
    3. Gabriele Mari & Giorgio Cutuli, 2019. "Do Parental Leaves Make the Motherhood Wage Penalty Worse? Assessing Two Decades of German Reforms," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 1025, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    job exit; fixed-term employment; screening; Germany;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General

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