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Reciprocal Brokered Deposits And Bank Risk

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  • Sherrill Shaffer

Abstract

Economic theory predicts that reciprocal brokered deposits, by facilitating an extension of deposit insurance coverage, may exacerbate moral hazard and reduce market discipline for banks, permitting them to take more risk in various dimensions. Using a newly available dataset, this note explores empirical evidence related to that hypothesis.

Suggested Citation

  • Sherrill Shaffer, 2010. "Reciprocal Brokered Deposits And Bank Risk," CAMA Working Papers 2010-15, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    • Handle: RePEc:een:camaaa:2010-15
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    File URL: https://cama.crawford.anu.edu.au/sites/default/files/publication/cama_crawford_anu_edu_au/2021-06/15_shaffer_2010.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Cole, Rebel A. & Gunther, Jeffery W., 1995. "Separating the likelihood and timing of bank failure," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 1073-1089, September.
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    3. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Detragiache, Enrica, 2002. "Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(7), pages 1373-1406, October.
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    7. Shaffer, Sherrill, 1998. "The Winner's Curse in Banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 359-392, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Sherrill Shaffer, 2013. "Reciprocal deposits and incremental bank risk," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 45(34), pages 4857-4860, December.
    2. Doug Dyer & Majdi Quttainah & Pengfei Ye, 2015. "Privatization, intermediation and performance: global evidence," Eurasian Economic Review, Springer;Eurasia Business and Economics Society, vol. 5(2), pages 207-229, December.
    3. Li, Guo & Shaffer, Sherrill, 2015. "Reciprocal brokered deposits, bank risk, and recent deposit insurance policy," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 366-384.
    4. Felix Noth & Lena Tonzer, 2017. "Bank risk proxies and the crisis of 2007/09: a comparison," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(7), pages 498-501, April.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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