Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Core Rationalizability in Two-Agent Exchange Economies

Contents:

Author Info

  • Bossert, Walter

    (U of Nottingham and Rice U)

  • Sprumont, Yves

    (Universite de Montreal)

Abstract

We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set of core elements of the economy for any given initial endowment vector. The approach followed in this paper deviates from the standard rational choice model in that a rationalization in terms of a profile of individual orderings rather than in terms of a single individual or social preference relation is analyzed.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~econ/papers/2000papers/07Bossert.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Rice University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2000-07.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Feb 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ecl:riceco:2000-07

Contact details of provider:
Postal: MS-22, 6100 South Main, Houston, TX 77005-1892
Phone: (713) 527-4875
Fax: (713) 285-5278
Email:
Web page: http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~econ/papers/index.html
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Indrajit Ray & Lin Zhou, . "Game Theory Via Revealed Preferences," Discussion Papers 00/15, Department of Economics, University of York.
  2. Brown, Donald J & Matzkin, Rosa L, 1996. "Testable Restrictions on the Equilibrium Manifold," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1249-62, November.
  3. Sprumont, Yves, 2000. "On the Testable Implications of Collective Choice Theories," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 205-232, August.
  4. Sen, Amartya K, 1971. "Choice Functions and Revealed Preference," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(115), pages 307-17, July.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. T. Demuynck, 2006. "Existence of closed and complete extensions applied to convex, homothetic an monotonic orderings," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 06/407, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  2. BOSSERT, Walter & SUZUMURA, Kotaro, 2006. "Non-Deteriorating Choice without Full Transitivity," Cahiers de recherche 10-2006, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  3. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Donni, Olivier, 2006. "Learning from a Piece of Pie: The Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 2128, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Bossert, W. & Sprumont, Y., 2001. "Non-Deteriorating Choice," Cahiers de recherche 2001-01, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  5. BOSSERT, Walter & SPRUMONT, Yves, 2002. "Efficient and Non-Deteriorating Choice," Cahiers de recherche 2002-10, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  6. Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2013. "Observable implications of Nash and subgame-perfect behavior in extensive games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 471-477.
  7. Ruediger Bachmann, 2006. "Testable Implications of Pareto Efficiency and Individualrationality," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 489-504, November.
  8. Carvajal, Andres & Ray, Indrajit & Snyder, Susan, 2004. "Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1-2), pages 1-40, February.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecl:riceco:2000-07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.